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ABSTRACT 
The assignment process in an organization of any nature (i.e., military) plays a crucial 
role towards the direction of efficiency and effectiveness. A well-designed assignment 
process is a handy tool for the decision makers to fulfill the organization’s goals. 
This thesis explores the application of two-sided matching theory in the Hellenic 
Navy’s assignment process. Three mechanisms (Priority-Deferred Acceptance and Top 
Trading Cycle) are chosen and developed, taking into account the magnitude of specific 
attributes like past performance, educational level, experience, officers’ preferences and 
positions’ requirements/priorities in order to achieve the most effective matching among 
officers and positions.  
A fully detailed example and a few more cases are described, different scoring 
methods are used for evaluation, the results are compared and recommendations are 
provided so as to enable the matching theory to be suitably applied to the Hellenic 
Navy’s assignment process.  
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Thus far, all officers of the Hellenic Navy have been able to offer their services in 
any position (key or not), given their level of experience and a few other characteristics. 
There is no significant evidence to justify potential inefficiency; however, the present 
placement procedure is likely simple and time consuming due to the lack of a structural 
mechanism.  It puts more weights to only a few parts of each officer’s available data (i.e., 
their preferences, the time that they served on board different types of ships and previous 
service in similar positions, etc.) and less to others that might be equally or more 
important. Additionally, positions with different requirements might be filled based on 
the same order of criteria even though the positions have different priorities.  Moreover, 
subjective factors might be in place and closely related to the personality of those who 
make decisions about placements. 
Through this thesis, three two-sided matching mechanisms will be described and 
applied to achieve the best matching between officers (with various level of education, 
experience, performance and preferences) and specific positions of various services of the 
Hellenic Navy. The above mentioned approach as a new systematic procedure could be a 
handy tool for decision makers to control for the gaps that already exist or even to replace 
the present placement procedure.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to achieve the most effective matching among 
officers (with specific attributes) and positions (leading or not) of the Hellenic Navy. The 
author will apply variations of a well-established matching/assignment model to the 
Hellenic Navy’s preferences and the quality and preferences of naval officers. The goal 
of the study is to efficiently allocate officers to specific positions of the Hellenic Navy. 
Thus, taking into account the possession of a master’s degree as an indicator of an 
advanced level of education, the kind of experience each officer has, their scores in 
evaluation reports and their preferences, the author tries to achieve the best match among 
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the preferences of those officers and the priorities/requirements that each position has. To 
do so, the methodology will be an exercise in evaluating various matching/assignment 
mechanisms.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Questions:  
 How human capital factors like education, experience and performance 
level could affect the assignment procedure in the military environment?    
 Which type of two-sided matching model should be used to best match 
quality and preferences of the Hellenic Navy’s officers with position 
requirements/priorities in various cases?  
 What are some practical implications of utilizing the two-sided matching 
models?    
2. Secondary Questions:  
 How a specific position’s preference list is created, taking into 
consideration its priorities/requirements and the characteristics of the 
eligible officers? 
 Are the Hellenic Navy’s evaluation reports a reliable tool for the 
assignment process? How could they become even more reliable? 
 
D. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope of this thesis will include the following:  
 A literature review of specific human capital factors (possession of a 
master’s degree as an indicator of a high level of education, experience 
and performance) that could affect the personnel assignment procedures in 
combination with personnel preferences and the priorities/requirements of 
specific positions. 
 An attempt to turn each officer’s performance and experience (that so far 
has been described in words) into numerical values so as to be used as 
crucial factors in the models. 
 An attempt to review the existing form of the Hellenic Navy’s evaluation 
reports so as to broaden the quality of information included and examine if 
there are any important factors that are missing.  
 A presentation of the two-sided matching theory focusing on three specific 
mechanisms that could be applied in the Hellenic Navy’s assignment 
procedure.  
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 The application of the three two-sided matching mechanisms in a full- 
detailed example in order to examine the results of using these 
mechanisms in the Hellenic Navy’s assignment procedure. In addition, the 
presentations of more examples that cover various cases, check the 
strengths-weaknesses of the mechanisms, and compare the results so as to 
choose the appropriate mechanism for each specific case.  
 The application of three main scoring methods (nine versions in total) 
based on mathematical formulas and statistical parameters in order to 
examine the effectiveness of each two-sided matching mechanism that are 
applied in the Hellenic Navy’s assignment process examples.  
 
E. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology used in this thesis research will consist of the following steps:   
 A literature review, based on research of textbooks and studies, will 
explain the magnitude of personnel-specific skills like level of education 
(in terms of the possession of a master’s degree), level of performance 
(evaluation reports), and level of experience.  
 A second literature review will present the two-sided matching theory, 
focusing and describing the function and further characteristics of three 
specific mechanisms. 
 The two-sided matching theory will be applied to the Hellenic Navy’s 
assignment procedure by taking into account the above mentioned human 
capital factors in combination with officers’ preferences and positions’ 
requirements; several examples will be developed towards that direction. 
 The three main scoring methods will be applied using mathematical 
formulas and statistical parameters in order to examine the results of each 
matching mechanism and conclude the most appropriate one. 
 The results will be analyzed, conclusions will be derived and 
recommendations will be made.     
F. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THE STUDY 
This study will develop three two-sided matching models, based on game theory, 
so as to achieve the best matching of the Hellenic Navy’s officer and positions by using 
specific criteria. The result will be the maximization of performance, and as an outcome 
overall efficiency of the organization. The model could then be used for key positions 
and for other positions too and become a handy tool for decision makers by replacing the 
existing time-consuming procedures.      
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G. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
The thesis is organized as follows:  
 Chapter II explains the magnitude of a high level of education (through the 
possession of master’s degrees), experience (converted in numerical 
value) and performance (through evaluation reports) of an officer in order 
for these factors to be taken into consideration to the assignment 
procedure of assigning officers of the Hellenic Navy to key positions.    
 Chapter III provides an overview of the two-sided matching theory 
(etymology- history- characteristics- advantages/disadvantages) and 
focuses on the application of three two-sided matching mechanisms: 
Priority, Deferred Acceptance and Top Trading Cycle.  
 Chapter IV provides several examples for the application of the above 
mentioned mechanisms to the Hellenic Navy officers’ assignment 
procedure, compares/analyzes the results of the three mechanisms, and 
highlights interesting points that are extracted. 
 Chapter V proposes and applies three main scoring methods based on 
mathematical formulas and statistical parameters in order to evaluate the 
three two-sided matching mechanisms so as to contribute in the selection 
of the most preferable one. 
 Chapter VI includes a summary, highlights and, conclusions, and provides 
recommendations for the application of two-sided matching mechanisms 





 II. THE ASSIGNMENT PROCESS 
A.  HUMAN CAPITAL - INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL   
It is well acknowledged that human capital is the major factor of an organization. 
Human capital is not just the personnel, the people that work in/for the organization; it is 
also what these people offer and how they contribute to the organization’s function. 
“Human capital is the collective value of the capabilities, knowledge, skills, life 
experience and motivation of an organizational workforce.” ¹ Since it is the factor that 




Figure 1.   Human Capital 
However, recent theories consider human capital as an element (the most 
important by far) of a more general term called intellectual capital. There are various 
definitions but all of them see intellectual capital as a conceptual platform from which to 
view, analyze, and hopefully quantify the intangible assets of an organization. The other 
primary elements of intellectual capital are social and organizational capital. According 
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to Baron and Armstrong, “the tripartite concept of intellectual capital indicates that, while 
it is individuals who generate, retain and use knowledge (human capital), this knowledge 
is enhanced by the interactions between them (social capital) to generate the 
institutionalized knowledge possessed by an organization (organizational capital).”² Any 





Figure 2.   Intellectual Capital 
Throughout the thesis, the author will focus on human capital because it is the factor that 
includes personnel and other characteristics that are the core of the assignment process. 
 The management and use of an organization’s human capital is a crucial factor 
for its efficiency and its effectiveness. Efficiency and effectiveness are often considered 
synonyms, but they have different meanings when applied to the process of management 
in an organization. According to Mathis and Jackson, “efficiency is the degree to which 
operations are done in an economical manner” while “effectiveness of an organization is 
a measure of the ability of a program, project, or task to produce a specific desired effect 
or result that can be measured.”¹ In simple words, efficiency is doing things right and 
effectiveness is doing the right things.         
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B. ASSIGNMENT OF PERSONNEL 
Assignment is the process according to which the organization’s personnel is 
employed in such a way that covers both the organization’s needs and the personnel’s 
preferences. A well-designed and easy to use assignment process is a handy tool for the 
organization’s decision makers; the results are beneficial and towards the direction that 
fulfills the organization’s goals. If an employee is satisfied with his/her assignment, this 
can cause an increase to his/her mood, morale, performance, productivity, and even 
retention. Everything seems to improve and the goals tend to be met. In reverse, a 
potential placement of employees in positions where the requirements do not meet their 
skills may have undesirable results and suboptimal outcomes.  
Therefore, efficiency and effectiveness are the major objects of an assignment 
process. An assignment process is said to be efficient when it matches appropriate, well-
trained, and skillful personnel to specific jobs. On the other hand, effectiveness in the 
assignment process has to do with timeliness. An assignment process is said to be 
effective when the personnel occupy specific jobs at the right time.³ Both parameters can 
be seen and evaluated from the employee’s and position’s or organization’s point of 
view.  
The design and the application of an appropriate assignment process inside an 
organization is not a simple procedure and it depends on various parameters. The number 
of employees, their skills/abilities/knowledge/educational level/experience/preferences 
(human capital in general) in combination with each position’s specific requirements, 
organizational culture/strategy/partial policies, and multiple other criteria that have to be 
met, even in a minimum degree, prove the complexity of an assignment process and 
indicate the necessity of its existence. The above mentioned complexity may lead to non-
optimal assignments, and it is possible for human error to affect the procedure and thus 
the consequences will be negative for both for the organization and personnel. The 
assignment process in a military organization differs substantially from that of a normal 
market organization. A plethora of unique qualitative and quantitative features makes the 
process more complex and more difficult to be “solved” in an optimal manner; some of 
these features are the following:  
 8 
 Hierarchy plays a catalytic role in every aspect of military life. 
 The participation of high rank/senior/junior/petty officers and personnel in 
general in the assignment process is compulsory.  
 Large groups of personnel members have to be assigned simultaneously. 
 The process takes place several times during the year, each time for 
different categories of personnel.  
 Manpower data is huge and information load is increased day by day.  
 Preferences (from positions and personnel) and human needs have to be 
taken into consideration. 
Moreover, it must be taken into account that in most cases the military assignment 
process, including manpower data collection/managing and the matching procedure, 
takes place manually and without using a decision support system (DSS). Thus, the 
“problematic” issue concerning the military assignment process is revealed clearly. That 
does not mean that the result of a current assignment procedure is not satisfactory, but 
most of the times it is far to be considered as the optimal one.  
C. THE HELLENIC NAVY’S ASSIGNMENT PROCESS 
The purpose of the thesis is to apply two-sided matching theory in the Hellenic 
Navy assignment process in order to achieve the most effective matching among the 
officers and key positions. Therefore, it would be useful to present the current assignment 
process briefly but important to mention from the beginning that the process is not known 
to personnel with full details.  
The process starts one year before the implementation of assignments when each 
officer submits by mail to the Department of Personnel his/her annual preference list 
which contains the positions where he/she would prefer to be assigned. Also, this list 
gives each officer the potential to include further information, whether very important 
(like report of personal issues, acquisition of a master’s degree or a foreign language 
certificate) or less important (like change of home address, etc.). Officers’ preference lists 
are just a part of the manpower data that the Department of Personnel keeps in its 
possession. Some of the data that needs to be taken into account by the detailers during 
the assignment process are annual or special performance evaluation reports, certificates 
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of educational level, records of previous positions, and punishments for disciplinary 
reasons. Then, the manpower data are processed and finally the matching among the 
officers and positions takes place.     
Parameters that act as a barrier towards the assignment process’s direction for an 
optimal result are the following:  
 The enormous volume of manpower data. 
 The lack of a manpower database that would give the detailers the 
opportunity for direct/fast access and managing of significant information. 
 The fact that the assignment process takes place not just once but a few 
times every year; each time the process concerns officers with different 
characteristics.  
The results of facing these parameters is an extensive time-consuming procedure 
that lasts many weeks and even months, significant effort from the detailers, and data that 
has not been processed in the optimal manner or been taken into consideration at all. 
Thus, it is logical that the final result is often a suboptimal one for both officers and 
positions.  
D. HUMAN DECISION MAKING IN THE ASSIGNMENT PROCESS 
The above mentioned barriers during the assignment process are caused by factors 
that have to do with the structure, organization and followed procedures through 
personnel issues processed in the Hellenic Navy. However, there is another factor, 
equivalent or even more important, that affects the result of the assignment process, —the 
human factor and specifically in this case human decision making.  
Decision making is a conscious process of making choices among alternatives 
with the intention of moving toward some desired state of affairs.⁴ Having the heavy 
weight of making important decisions (like assignments) the decision-makers (detailers) 
try to decide based on pure logic or rationality. According to Mc Shane and Von 



























Figure 3.   The Rational Choice Decision-making Process⁵ 
The “rational choice decision-making cycle” seems to be logical but its 
application faces various problems.⁵ 
 The “cycle” assumes that the decision-makers are efficient and logical 
information processing machines. 
 It focuses on logical thinking but it does not pay attention to emotions, a 
factor that affects the decision-making process significantly and in many 
ways. 
 Some steps are based on appropriate and accurate information, thus 
incomplete information processing leads to results that are below the 
expected ones.  
 Decision-makers generally do not try to maximize the outcome; that is 
they make an acceptable decision, without looking for the solution with 
the highest pay-off. That happens because they cannot develop and 
evaluate all the alternatives, so they select an option with a “score” above 
a subjective minimum limit considering that it could satisfy the needs. 
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 Stakeholders (superior and subordinate officers) with vested interests in 
the assignment process try to “frame” the situation by influencing the 
decision makers through various ways.   
Applying decision-making theory to the Hellenic Navy assignment procedure and 
taking into account the above mentioned barriers in combination with the size of the 
organization, its complexity, the absence of a manpower database and decision support, 
the author realizes that an optimal result is difficult to be achieved. Thus, the Department 
of Personnel is likely to be satisfied with just a “good” one. However, there are ways to 
improve the process from its first step until the final step. The utilization of advanced 
technology (networks, internet, etc.) in order to simplify and eliminate the time needed 
for the collection and managing of manpower data would be a useful tool towards 
improving the process. Furthermore, the manning of the Department of Personnel with 
more staff in order to limit the workload and pressure that derives from the importance of 
its tasks could be proven a practical measure.  
However, the most important direction in which the assignment process must be 
headed is the elimination of issues that affect it in a negative way, like ad hoc, favoritism 
etc. A way to eliminate those issues is the adopting and application of a specific matching 
mechanism, a mechanism that would take into consideration the most crucial 
characteristics/skills of each officer, his/her preferences, and the requirements of the 
positions that must be covered. The detailer, by following predefined steps and specific 
rules through a mechanism, does not have the opportunity to “allow” such 
actions/behaviors (coming from emotions or any other factor) that influence the 
assignment process. Perhaps such issues will not be completely eliminated this way, but 
at least they will be reduced.  
For that reason, two-sided matching theory was chosen and three specific 
mechanisms will be developed and applied in The Hellenic Navy’s assignment process. 
In order to simulate a real situation as much as possible, the author assumes that fifteen 
officers are eligible to cover ten positions. The detailer has an extensive amount of 
information about the officers and thus it will make it difficult to manage “comme il faut” 
(that means, in an appropriate way); therefore the author proposes that he/she should take 
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into account just the most important ones. The question that emerges is which of all the 
characteristics play a significant role in the assignment process?  
There are major and secondary characteristics. A major focus would consider the 
officer’s performance that is imprinted in the performance evaluation reports, the 
educational level in terms of possession of a master’s degree, and experience. Some of 
the secondary characteristics could be important in some cases like knowledge of 
appropriate foreign languages in case of a position abroad. In general, their magnitude 
cannot affect the final assignment because positions’ preference lists will be created and 
the officers that fall short will be positioned last in the order for the specific positions 
(i.e., an officer that does not speak French will be positioned last in order for the Paris 
Naval Attaché’s position). 
E.  MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Performance 
Various definitions exist for performance, concerning different types of activities 
(like job, task, academic, and financial performances, etc.). The type of performance on 
which the author focuses on in the thesis is job performance. Job performance refers to 
the way that an employee performs his/her work. There is no doubt that an employee’s 
performance is the characteristic with the greatest importance because it is strongly 
related to the organization’s outcome and success. Better performance increases the 
possibility for success.  
There are several characteristics that an employee must possess in order to 
perform his/her work effectively and successfully (i.e., ability, motivation, intelligence, 
etc.). These characteristics are called selection criteria. Selection criteria are set according 
to the hierarchy level of an employee in an organization; i.e., for a managerial job 
performance, more specific selection criteria like “leading and deciding,” “supporting and 
cooperating,” etc. are needed.¹   
However, even though job performance could be considered as individual’s 
behavior (a group of employee characteristics and actions) it is not to do just with the 
employee. The role of the supervisors in an employee’s successful job performance is 
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crucial too. Supervisors must illustrate the job description to each employee, explain 
thoroughly the position’s requirements and standards that the employee has to meet, and 
set the strategy, goals and objectives clearly even on a daily basis if they think that it 
would be helpful. This procedure or specific parts of it must be repeated if the supervisors 
estimate that it is necessary. This is the first part of their role. The second part, which is 
the most difficult to be implemented and the most important, is performance 
measurement. Performance measurement is the collection of information regarding the 
performance of an individual (employee, manager, etc.) or group of individuals. 
Measurement of an employee’s performance allows the supervisor to: 
 Evaluate how well the assigned job is being done.  
 Check/control if the organization’s strategy is being followed. 
 Interfere in cases of declination of the organization’s goals. 
 Motivate by giving new incentives. 
 Reward by promoting or offering material goods. 
 Improve what he/she realizes needs to be improved. 
However, what is the best way of measuring performance? What elements must 
be taken into account in order to achieve a fair and realistic representation of an 
employee’s performance? The only way of measuring performance is to use statistics that 
concern the collection of data, analysis, and interpretation of results. It is obvious that 
performance cannot be measured accurately; this is because it contains intangible 
characteristics and characteristics that cannot be measured directly but just based on 
indirect observations, estimations or assumptions. Most of the organizations use an 
annual performance report where the supervisors grade various characteristics of an 
employee’s tangibles and intangibles, describe his/her achievements, compare them with 
the organization’s expectations, write comments, and make conclusions and 
recommendations. This method allows the leaders to have a global view of each 
employee’s abilities/personality/overall performance, and a helpful database for future 
use.   
Figure 4 illustrates a mechanism of good job performance that contains predictors 
of selection criteria and elements of good job performance. The author needs to mention 
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that predictors of selection criteria are measurable or visible indicators that in case of 
possession an employee is likely to perform his/her work better. It is a factor strongly 
connected with decision making and very important for the development of his examples 
in the following chapters.¹ 
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Figure 4.   Job Performance, Selection Criteria and Predictors ¹  
As far as the Hellenic Navy is concerned, a method similar to the above-
mentioned one has been adopted in order to measure the performance of its staff. Once a 
year under normal circumstances (or more than one under exceptional circumstances) the 
direct supervisor (first evaluator) fills out a performance evaluation report for each of 




signs it as a proof of acknowledgment or declares his/her objections in writing. Finally, it 
is forwarded to the second evaluator for the final signature and submission to the 
Department of Personnel. 
The form is a standard one with a specific pattern. It is an impressively well- 
designed form with various fields that must be filled in by the evaluators covering all the 
aspects of an officer’s personality and performance. Physical, mental, psychic, 
administrative, professional, special and ethical skills are the general fields on the form, 
while each of them is divided into many subfields. Furthermore, there is space for 
general/special comments and a final assessment (a number between 0–100) that 
indicates the general ability and performance of the person being evaluated. If this fully 
detailed evaluation form is filled out in an accurate manner, it provides a complete image 
of the person being evaluated performance for the specific time period.   
However, there is a deficiency that affects the credibility of the procedure in a 
negative way; the procedure does not take into consideration neither the personality nor 
the perceptual errors of the evaluator. There is no referral at all to the evaluator. That 
means that the comparison between two officers is based just on absolute numbers no 
matter who the evaluator was in each case. For example, assume that two officers of the 
same rank, O₁ and O₂, serve in different positions (i.e., different ships) and must be 
evaluated by their supervisors (commanding officers), S₁ and S₂ respectively. S₁ is a very 
strict and demanding supervisor who grades his subordinates so far with an average of 
90/100 (best 93/100 and least 85/100); S₂ is a supervisor that follows a different way of 
leading and he grades his subordinates so far with an average of 98/100 (best 100/100 
and least 96/100). It is assumed that S₁ grades O₁’s general performance with 94/100 and 
S₂ grades O₂’s general performance with 96/100; in absolute numbers, O₂ had a better 
performance than O₁. However, if the issue is investigated thoroughly, it is realized that 
O₁ received the best grade that S₁ ever marked and O₂ received the worst grade that S₂ 
ever marked. That means that O₁ did not perform better than O₂ and his 96/100 compared 
to S₂’s 94/100 does not imply a better performance.  
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This problem is not caused just from the evaluator’s personality, principles and 
way of leading. It is also a matter of perception and the perceptual process. “Perception is 
the process of receiving information about and making sense of the world around us.”⁵ 
After that, the receiving information is filtered through an imperfect perceptual process 
where selecting, organizing and interpreting of information takes place. There are many 
different perceptual processes, while each of them creates bias (called perceptual error). 
Suggestively some of those perceptual processes are the following: ⁵  
 Selective attention: focusing on some information while ignoring other 
information. 
 Mental models: visual images in the mind that represent the external 
world.   
 Self-serving bias: attribute preferable outcomes to internal factors and 
failures to external ones. 
 Halo effect: the impression of a person based on a specific characteristic 
affects the impression of other characteristics. 
 Primary effect: an impression of someone is formed based on the 
information first received about him/her.  
Perceptual processes cannot be avoided but there are ways to eliminate their 
negative results (biases). Therefore, as far as evaluation reports are concerned the author 
looks for a different way to proceed, taking into account the evaluator’s characteristics 
(including potential biases) in order to reflect the performance as pragmatic as possible.  
A good solution to the above mentioned problem could be the performance 
evaluation system of the U.S. Marines. According to that system, all grades (in a 0.0 to 
5.0 scale) of the specific evaluator in the past are used in order to create a percentage 
context where the greatest grade would be 100% and the lowest one would be the 
respective percentage (i.e., if the greatest grade is 4.8 and the lowest 3.6, the 4.8 reflects 
the 100% of the context and the 3.6 reflects the 75% of the context). The grade that 
corresponds to the performance of the person being evaluated (i.e., 4.2) is put in the 
context (87.5%) and represents an actual performance comparable rather fairly to the 
other ones.   
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Finally, a minor issue is the accurate (as possible) estimate of the number that 
reflects the general performance of the person being evaluated. There is no mathematical 
or statistical formula that is used in order to calculate it, but there seems to be a number 
that represents the general impression that the evaluator has for those being evaluated. 
However, the number that reflects the general performance should be derived from the 
grades in the partial fields of the evaluation report; if not from all at least from the most 
important of them (the choice will take place according to Department of Personnel 
criteria). Then, a mathematical or statistical formula (i.e., arithmetic mean or standard 
deviation) could be used for the final calculation. 
2. Educational Level (Possession of a Master’s Degree) 
Education is likely to be the most important mechanism that contributes to the 
acquisition and development of human capital. It is the mean for an individual to acquire 
new skills and knowledge that will lead to important private and social benefits/returns. 
That means education is considered as an investment that is “spending now and expecting 
to gain in the future.”  
The amount of education that is acquired by an individual/worker/employee has a 
significant impact to his/her personality, work, and the labor force in general. A more 
educated individual/employee is more able to:  
 Absorb new information.⁶   
 Learn-by-doing.  
 Be trained. 
 Adopt new technologies. 
 Develop innovation. 
 Learn and execute successfully complex tasks. 
 “Develop features like work habits, awareness of time, dependability”⁷. 
As a result, a more educated individual/employee increases his/her personal 
productivity. This implies:  
 The demand and achievement of a higher wage in his/her professional life. 
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 The increase of labor participation, the improvement of labor force as a 
factor of production, the decrease of unemployment probability, and the 
decrease of turnovers as far as the labor force in general is concerned.⁸  
Also, there are effects (private and public) that have nothing to do with the 
market. Researchers have proven that a more educated individual tends to protect his/her 
investment (education) by taking care of his/her health issues or by taking preventative 
measures more often than a non-educated individual in order to avoid unpleasant events 
in health matters.⁹ Furthermore, education enables people to be better parents, children, 
neighbors, citizens and voters contributing to the institution of a stable and democratic 
society.⁶ Finally, the criminal activity in an area is conversely proportional with the 
educational level of its residents. That is, the average crime rate is decreased in areas with 
a high percentage of educated residents.  
However, a question that derives from this topic is if all these implications lead to 
increased economic growth. The answer in that question is neither positive nor negative. 
A shortage of educated people may lead to decreased economic growth, but it is not 
certain that the influence of more educated people will guarantee the expected result. The 
reason is that the relationship between education (and human capital in general) and 
economic growth is highly conditioned by the quality and distribution of education in the 
labor force and the economic structure of the country. Investing in more and better-
distributed education in the labor force helps create conditions that could lead to higher 
economic growth, but this is by no means sufficient. It is also necessary to adopt policies 
that lead to the creation of diversified, dynamic, and competitive sectors capable of 
absorbing the more educated labor force to translate education (human capital in general) 
into higher economic growth.⁷  
Education, having the shape of an investment, implies not only benefits but costs 
too that one hopes to compensate over a period of time. Costs of education are divided in 
two parts—tangible or direct costs and intangible costs. The first part includes costs that 




and other expenses concerning schooling; the second part includes costs that cannot be 
measured like time spent, psychic losses (that occur due to the difficulties that one might 
be facing), etc.⁸   
Therefore, the big question is whether education is a good investment or not. Τhis 
is a question that concerns both individuals and government/company decision-makers; 
individuals wonder if education will increase their monetary and non-monetary 
benefitswhile policy/decision makers have to evaluate if the social/company benefits of 
the provided education will outweigh the costs. There are a few methods (i.e., net present 
value method, internal rate of return method) developed to answer this question, but the 
problem is that they analyze only the monetary part by using statistics and data. 
Furthermore, the delay in receiving the returns in comparison to the costs, the above 
mentioned prerequisites and other important factors like innate ability, psychic costs, etc. 
that are biased and difficult to be measured make the final result not completely accurate 
or even that useful.  
The following figures illustrate two examples concerning the monetary effects of 
education. In the first example (Figure 5), two individuals at the age of eighteen follow 
different directions; individual A begins to work while individual B goes to a university. 
Thus, two earning streams appear; earning stream A of the high school graduate which 
starts to rise immediately but not so high and earning stream B of the university graduate 
which starts with a negative income for the first four years but after that it takes off and 
rises above stream A.¹⁰ It is obvious that in the future the earnings of individual B will 
bypass those of individual A (the difference of earnings is called gross benefit) and that 
happens due to the educational benefits received by individual B. Individual B can 
achieve higher wages than individual A.  
In the second example (Figure 6), both individuals A and B are university 
graduates and begin to work at the age of twenty-two. It is assumed that for various 
reasons employee A has a slightly higher wage than employee B. At the age of thirty, 
employee B is chosen by his company’s decision makers to acquire a master’s degree 
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concerning his subject. Two years after, for the same reasons as in the previous example, 
the wage of employee B will rise and will be higher than that of employee A. 
The author has to clarify that the above mentioned examples (and their graphs) 
are presented in order to show the potential monetary benefits of an employee (or a 
student) that receives additional education in comparison with another employee (or a 
student) that he doesn’t. Of course the whole task is not so simple, an investment like that 
needs to be analyzed in depth using the Net Present Value or other evaluation method and 
taking into account parameters like discount rate, cash flow or even opportunity cost in 






























Figure 6.   Second Example in Monetary Effects of Education  
As far as the Hellenic Navy is concerned, the provided education to officers takes 
place in various time periods of their career. The first step takes place during their 
training in the Hellenic Naval Academy and it lasts four years. It includes teaching and a 
deep dive into a wide area of technical, theoretical and specialized courses/labs by taking 
advantage of technology and the presence of referable professors. After graduation from 
the Academy, an officer is considered to have the same educational level as a graduate 
from a top-ranking educational institute. After that, the provided education has the form 
of mandatory short-term courses (they usually last few months) that are professionally 
orientated. That means that they include updates to an officer’s knowledge and focus on 
his/her work in various positions (ships, repair stations, etc.) as well as a general view in 
war history, geopolitical strategy and global issues.  
Moreover, the Hellenic Navy offers to its officers the opportunity of acquiring a 
master’s degree in various sections (like information technology, management, computer 
science, shipbuilding, mechanical engineering, etc.) in the U.S., Great Britain, or at a 
domestic university. The acquisition of a master’s degree gives both the officers and the 
Hellenic Navy all the advantages that were discussed above. The percentage of the 
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officers that achieve to acquire a master’s degree having the support of the Hellenic Navy 
in various ways (like paying the tuition, allowing a time period of two years off, etc.) is 
ranges between approximately 20–25%.  
Comparing the acquired education of the market’s labor force with that of the 
Hellenic Navy’s internal labor force one can refer to differences and similarities. The 
implications that concern the individual’s professional life (demand of higher wage) and 
the labor force in general (increase of labor participation, improvement of labor force as a 
factor of production, decrease of unemployment’s probability, economic growth) do not 
apply in the Hellenic Navy due to the special military environment. In reverse, the 
implications for the further effects of education (parental behavior, upbringing, crime 
rate, health issues, etc.) apply the same way to the Hellenic Navy’s officers that have 
achieved to acquire a higher educational level. The obvious conclusion is that the 
Hellenic Navy’s decision makers believe that the acquisition of a master’s degree by an 
officer has beneficial effects, both for the officer and the Hellenic Navy even though the 
expenses are high. They believe that the benefits, through the increase of productivity, 
will compensate the Hellenic Navy for the losses that come from direct costs and 
foregone earnings, and for that reason the Hellenic Navy continues to contribute towards 
that direction.  
However, how can the author take into account the possession of a master’s 
degree if it is to be used as a criterion for the assignment process? Whether an officer 
possesses a master’s degree or not can be represented as a binary code where 1 represents 
an officer that possesses a master’s degree and 0 represents an officer without a master’s 
degree.   
So far, the author analyzed the past performance and education as characteristics 
that affect the assignment process; the last (but not least) major characteristic that the 
author is going to evaluate is experience. 
3. Experience  
Experience, in general terms, is a concept that includes accumulated knowledge 
and skills gained by doing a job, an activity or being in a lot of different situations.¹¹ 
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Experience is an “advantage” that plays an important role in the hiring process. Some of 
the reasons that contribute to the importance of its role are the following:  
An experienced candidate 
 Already has valuable insight by working in different environments under 
different circumstances, having various duties, and trying to achieve goals 
of a different nature. 
 Has already developed to a satisfactory degree various skills (i.e., 
communication skills) that an employer expects from his/her employees. 
 Has a self-confident personality and it is easier for him/her to make a 
difficult decision. 
 Has already worked in a team and cooperated with various types of 
people, supervisors and subordinates. 
These are some reasons for which organizations hire on the basis of work 
experience; in general terms that happens because employers expect experienced workers 
to perform better than non-experienced ones. However, do their expectations come true? 
Are a firm’s expectations about the benefits of hiring an experienced employee always 
met?  In order to answer that question, the author has to divide experience in two 
subcategories—prior work experience and prior related work experience. Prior work 
experience provides the opportunity for knowledge acquisition, and prior related work 
experience provides not only opportunity but also greater potential applicability of that 
knowledge to the new context.¹² Prior work experience is likely to have a neutral effect 
on performance while prior related work experience has both a positive and a negative 
effect; a strong positive one because prior related work experience may increase 
performance (indirectly) via related knowledge and skill; in few words, a firm that hires 
an experienced (in related tasks) employee also brings additional precious human capital. 
However, there is also a direct negative effect due to behavioral and cognitive rigidities.¹²  
That does not mean that all work experience generates useful knowledge and 
skills when applied in a different environment, similar to the old one or not. This is easier 
to achieve in a case of jobs of a similar nature where the acquired relevant knowledge and 
skill can be applicable to performance in a new environment; however, in a case of jobs 
with unrelated work activities this is likely to be more difficult. 
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Experience in military service can be also separated into prior work experience 
and prior related work experience. The difference from the market case is that prior work 
experience in the military environment has a positive effect in performance even in a case 
where an officer is assigned in a position of a totally different nature (i.e., from a frigate 
to an office of the General Staff). Of course, the effect is not the same as the effect of 
prior related work experience, but it exists and it is helpful for the officer. As far as the 
Hellenic Navy is concerned, the majority of officers have a similar level of “provided” 
experience. It is the Hellenic Navy’s policy that all officers (except those of special 
services like submariners, etc.) are assigned in different positions almost every two years; 
therefore, the officers have the opportunity to acquire miscellaneous knowledge and 
develop their skills by serving in different positions. However that is not enough; the 
acquisition of experience is not just a matter of opportunities but it also depends on the 
way that each person tries to grab the provided opportunities. It is also based on the 
desire and effort that an officer makes in order to acquire the experience. Thus, even 
though the officers have almost the same opportunities, their level of experience differs.   
The measurement of an officer’s experience, and especially the conversion of his 
experience into a number, is not easily done in a fair and objective way because 
experience is an intangible feature and has to do with the positions in which the officer 
has served in the past. In addition, it is not necessary to measure experience under normal 
circumstances. However, such a procedure would be helpful to take place during the 
assignment process and the extracted “number” that represents an officer’s experience 
would be useful as a factor that could be taken into account. As an example, assume an 
officer who has served six years in a frigate and two years in a destroyer; this officer has 
two different “countable” levels of experience, one level that represents his experience in 
frigates and another one that represents his experience in destroyers. Thus, during the 
assignment procedure the Department of Personnel must numerate a candidate officer’s 
experience according to the position that must be covered.  
A potential method to measure an officer’s experience takes into consideration 
his/her past service both in a similar (or even the same position but under different duties) 
position and in a position of a different nature but having the same duties. For example, 
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in order to measure the experience of an officer who is a candidate for the position of 
Vice Commander in Frigates Command his/her past service in the specific command or 
other command of a similar nature (like Destroyers Command) will be looked at as well 
as his/her past service as a Vice Commander anywhere else. Weights must be taken into 
account to distribute in a fair way the services that are included in the measurement of 
experience. For example, assume that a candidate for the Frigates Command Vice 
Commander position served in the past three years in the specific command as a staff 
officer, two years in the Destroyers Command as a staff officer, and one-and-a-half years 
as a Vice Commander in another position. These services cannot have the same weight; 
the candidate’s previous service in the same staff seems to be more important from the 
other two. Thus, a potential mathematical formula for the calculation of experience could 
be: E = 5x3 + 3x2+ 2x1.5, where 5/3 and 2 are potential weights for each type of service. 
The Department of Personnel must specify the weights that will be used in order to 
calculate the officers’ experience during the assignment process.  
So far, the author has analyzed the three major characteristics that are predictors 
of selection criteria and must be taken into account in the assignment process—the 
performance, educational level and experience. The Department of Personnel will draw 
the table that contains the candidate officers’ scores in each characteristic and will set the 
priority of requirements for each position that has to be covered. Therefore, the officers 
will be classified according to their score in the first requirement (from higher to lower), 
and in a case of a tie the officer with the higher second characteristic will have the 
advantage. In the extreme case of a second tie, the officer with the higher third 
characteristic will be chosen. Using this methodology, the Department of Personnel will 
create the positions’ preference list and in combination with the officers’ preference list 
(that is submitted by them annually) and the application of two-sided matching theory, 
the assignment process will take place.  
For example, assume that the Department of Personnel set the priority of 
requirements for a specific position as follows: performance and possession of a master’s 
degree. The candidate officers and their characteristics (extracted as described above) are 
shown in Table 1.  
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O1 96 1 15
O2 98 0 18
O3 96 0 22
O4 97 1 17
O5 98 0 23
O6 98 1 20  
 
It can be seen that officers O2, O5 and O6 have the same performance score (98), 
so the tie will be broken by the second characteristic (possession of a master’s degree). 
Officer O6 is the only officer that possesses a master’s degree, thus he is the first choice 
in the preference list. Officers O5 and O2 do not possess a master’s degree so the tie will 
be broken by the experience score; Officer O5’s score is 98 while officer O2’s score is 
95, thus, officer O5 is the second choice and officer O2 the third. Similarly, the fourth 
choice is officer O4 and the tie between officers O1-O3 is broken by the second 
characteristic (officer O1 possesses a master’s degree while officer O3 does not). 
Consequently, the final position’s preference list would be as follows: O6, O5, O2, O4, 
O1 and O3.  
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III. TWO-SIDED MATCHING THEORY 
A. BACKGROUND 
Etymologically, the term “two-sided matching market” refers to the presence of 
two distinct groups of agents (two-sided) and the bilateral nature of exchange where 
every agent of each group seeks to be matched with his/her most preferred agent from the 
other group (matching).¹³ The process for generating the matching between the agents of 
the two groups is called a two-sided matching mechanism.  
The need for the application of two-sided matching started around the turn of the 
last century and it concerned the internal medical market and the assignment of medical 
students to hospital residency programs. Many difficulties appeared as the years passed¹⁴, 
including the following. 
 The hard competition between hospitals because the number of positions 
offered was greater than the number of available students. 
 Students were unhappy because they were pressed to accept offers before 
their alternate status was resolved and without having the potential to wait 
until the last minute for a more preferable offer. 
 Hospitals were also unhappy because they faced many last-minute 
rejections from their preferable candidates and the alternate ones had in 
the meantime already accepted other positions.  
The National Intern Matching Program (NIMP) was the first two-sided matching 
mechanism that applied in practice in the 1951–52 U.S medical market, even though it 
faced the above mentioned issues. Each student that was in the final year of medical 
school was interviewed for some programs and each program interviewed some students. 
Afterwards, the students ranked the programs according to their preferences and vice 
versa. Finally, each student was assigned to a specific program while each program 
covered its available positions with a specific number of students. In a case of unfilled 
positions, those could be covered by foreign students, and in a case of unmatched 
students they could seek matching individually. Over the years the program was 
developed trying to solve the apparent problematic issues, and nowadays it is still in use 
with a slightly different name (National Resident Matching Program- NRMP). ¹³  
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Figure 7.   The NIMP Algorithm¹³ 
The first memorable theoretical study of two-sided matching belongs to Milton 
Friedman and his 1955 article, “The Role of Government in Education,” which refers to 
the “school choice” topic. In this article, the term “school voucher” appears for the first 
time and it is an early step towards the direction to give parents the opportunity to choose 
the school their child will attend.¹⁵ In the last fifteen years, the usual practice of school 
choice according to geographical locations has changed. Miscellaneous mechanisms 
(with their advantages and disadvantages) were developed, leading to the introduction of 
various choice programs that allow parents to pick schools for their children within or 
outside their school district.                 
Furthermore, over the years the school choice topic and its literature is spread to 
other closely related topics like the college admission topic (namely, the assignment of 
candidates to colleges) and the allocation of dormitory rooms topic (that is, the allocation 
of on campus housing facilities to students). The first case as it was named and described 
by Gale and Shapley became very popular and was studied extensively, analyzed 
thoroughly and applied successfully in the college labor market.¹⁶ It is close to the school 
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choice topic but even closer to the medical market problem. That happens because in 
college admissions and the medical market, students and schools/hospitals are both 
agents with preferences and priorities, while school choice schools do not have 
preferences but wait to be chosen by the students ¹⁷.  
In the second case, Hylland and Zeckhauser  propose a mechanism, known as 
random serial dictatorship, where the students are ordered by chance (single lottery) and 
the first student is assigned to his/her top choice, the second student to his/her top choice 
among the remaining slots, and so on. The specific mechanism is effective and can 
accommodate any hierarchy of seniorities, but it cannot be applied in school choice or 
college admission problems because the priority ordering of a student is different from 
school to school.¹⁷ 
As is obvious, the education market was the dominant field for the development 
of two-sided matching. Nowadays, various two-sided matching mechanisms/models are 
applied in a wide variety of real life markets (besides the education one) like the labor 
market, including various types of workers and firms, public employees and public 
positions, etc.). It is also applied in social processes (like marriageable men and women), 
providing significant solutions to the assignment problem.  
B. CHARACTERISTICS 
There are two basic matching models, differing only in whether the agents of each 
side prefer to be matched with (at most) one agent of the other group (one-to-one model) 
or with many agents of the other side (many-to-one model).  
The one-to-one model is known as the marriage model. The males represent the 
first group and the females the opposite group. Each person has a preference list that 
contains members of the opposite group with whom he/she would like to be engaged. 
Each agent is matched with one agent of the opposite group or remains single rather than 
be engaged with an undesirable agent. A significant remark is that the group that does the 
proposing must be assigned, because the matching could be different when men propose 
than when women propose.¹⁸  
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Example No 1        Men       Women           Potential Matching μ₁ 
Pm₁ (w₂, w₁, w₃)    Pw₁ (m₂, m₁, m₃)  m₁  w₁                                         
Pm₂ (w₁, w₃, w₂ )    Pw₂ (m₁, m₂, m₃)  m₂  w    
Pm₃ (w₃, w₁, w₂)          Pw₃ (m₃, m₁, m₂)  m₃  w₃ 
Figure 8.   The Marriage Model 
The many-to-one models are most frequently applied to the labor and education 
markets and are regarded as entry-level markets too; that is, in many cases the agents 
from the one side are entering the market for the first time.¹⁸ An example is the college 
admission model where each individual agent (college) of one group seeks to be matched 
with many agents (students) of the other group. In this type of model, each agent of the 
group of firms/colleges/schools seeks to be matched with a number of agents with similar 
characteristics and skills from the opposite side. Therefore, its preference list must be 
defined through a strategy and not just over individual workers/students but over a group 
of students that covers its requirements.  
 
Example No 2      Schools     Students           Potential Matching μ₂  
Ps₁ (i₂, i₁, i₃)         Pi₁ (s₂, s₁)   s₁  i₁                                              
Ps₂ (i₁, i₃, i₂)      Pi₂ (s₁, s₂)   s₂  i₂           
        Pi₃ (s₂, s₁)     i₃ 
Figure 9.   The Many-to-One Model 
There are three important things to really consider in the two-sided matching 
theory. First we will consider stability issue, one of the most important conditions in 
order to ensure the success of a matching assignment is stability. “Stability is used 
instead of the Nash equilibrium and as the main solution concept.”¹⁹ This does not mean 
that markets with unstable matches cannot operate, but the possibility is definitely 
eliminated. So, according to Roth and Sotomayor,¹³ and as far as one-to-one matching is 
concerned, “a matching is stable if it is not blocked by any individual or any pair of 
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agents;” an unstable matching takes place when a pair of agents that prefer each other as 
a partner is not matched and the specific pair is called a “blocking pair.”  
 For example, there are two men (m₁, m₂,) and two women (w₁, w₂) and we 
assume that the matching assignment is m₁-w₂, m₂-w₁. If m₁ prefers to be matched with 
w₂ (rather than w₁) and w₂ prefers to be matched with m₁ (rather than with m₂) then the 
matching is stable. 
 
Example No 3       Men        Women         Matching μ₃  
              Pm₁ (w₂, w₁)     Pw₁ (m₂, m₁)        m₁    w₁                   Stable 
              Pm₂ (w₁, w₂)     Pw₂ (m₁, m₂)        m₂     w₂                    Matching 
Figure 10.   Stable Matching 
If m₁ prefers to be matched with w₁ and w₁ prefers to be matched with m1 then the 
matching is unstable and the pair (m₁, w₁) is a blocking pair.  
 
         Men        Women       Matching μ₃  
              Pm₁ (w₁, w₂)     Pw₁ (m₁, m₂)      m₁                 w₁     Unstable  
              Pm₂ (w₂, w₁)     Pw₂ (m₂, m₁)      m₂                w₂     Matching 
Figure 11.   Unstable Matching 
If w₁ prefers to stay unmatched rather than be matched with m₂, it is said that w₁ blocks 
the matching individually. It is important to mention that according to Gayle and Shapley 
every one-to-one model has stable matching.¹⁶  
The main stability issues remain the same in a many-to-one matching model. The 
difference is that stability depends not only on individuals and pairs but also on a 
coalition of agents like students/workers/colleges/firms, and the way that this coalition 
can block a matching assignment. Roth asserts that “a matching μ is blocked by some 
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coalition A of colleges and students if, by matching among themselves, the students and 
colleges in A could all get an assignment preferable to μ.”¹³ In a case that there is no 
individual, pairwise or coalition blocking, the matching assignment is regarded as 
stable.¹⁸ 
The second important issue is Pareto efficiency. A matching is considered as 
Pareto efficient (or optimal) for one side of the market when there is no other outcome 
that makes every player on this side at least as well off and at least one player strictly 
better off; μ₁ in example 1 (Figure 8) is a Pareto efficient one. However, a matching μᵢ 
(m₁, w₂), (m₂, w₃) and (m₃, w₁) is not Pareto efficient because there is another match that 
some men (m₁) like at least as well as μᵢ and some men (m₂, m₃) prefer this than μᵢ.¹⁷ 
Finally a matching mechanism is said to be strategy proof when there is no 
incentive for any of the agents to lie about or hide their private information from the other 
agents; that is, the mechanism cannot be manipulated by agents misrepresenting 
preferences.¹³ However, under specific circumstances agents well-informed about other 
agents’ behavior could achieve to be matched with more preferable partners if they lie 
about their preferences. That is, a non-strategy proof mechanism could be proven better 
for some individuals.¹⁸ Furthermore, inside an organization the selection and application 
of a strategy focused on the expression of the other side agents’ true preferences would 
return better results.    
Before the author moves forward it would be helpful to mention some further 
substantial terms of two-sided matching theory: 
 An agent has strict preferences when he/she is not indifferent between any 
two acceptable mates, or between being matched to an acceptable mate 
and being unmatched.¹⁶ 
 A matching is individually rational when each student is assigned to an 
acceptable school or he/she remains unassigned.²⁰ In the above examples, 
the matches are individually rational since all pairs are mutually accepted.  
 Justified envy takes place when there is a pair of a student i and a school s 
he/she was not assigned to, such that i prefers s to his/her assignment, and 
i has a higher priority than some student who was assigned to s.²¹ It is said 
that matching eliminates justified envy when there is no pair 
student/school in which the student has the specific school in a lower 
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priority than another student who was assigned somewhere else.²² A 
mechanism eliminates justified envy if it generates a stable matching.²³ 
Another referable issue is the optimality. For each marriage model and many-to-
one model and when preferences are strict, there always exists two optimal stable 
matches, men-women optimal and student/worker-college/firm optimal stable matching 
respectively. Both optimal stable matches are produced through a specific mechanism 
called Deferred Acceptance mechanism (DA), which will be analyzed thoroughly in an 
upcoming section. Each of these matches is biased because it is extracted based on the 
preferences of each group. For example, in the marriage model a matching is men 
optimal if men propose and if every man likes the stable outcome at least the same as any 
other stable matching. The women optimal matching is produced in a similar way. The 
men optimal matching is the worst case scenario for the women because it matches each 
woman with her least preferred partner; that is, it improves men welfare at the expense of 
women and vice versa. Nevertheless, in practice the two outcomes are almost the same 
and have little difference.¹³ 
 
Example No 4         Men               Women                Optimal        Optimal  
     matching μ(m)   matching (w)  
Pm₁ (w₂, w₁, w₃)     Pw₁ (m₃, m₁, m₂)        m₁            w₁          m₁       w₁                                     
Pm₂ (w₁, w₃, w₂)   Pw₂ (m₂, m₁, m₃)        m₂            w₂  m₂       w₂                                
Pm₃ (w₁, w₂, w₃)    Pw₃ (m₃, m₁, m₂)        m₃            w₃  m₃       w₃ 
Figure 12.   Optimality 
C. ADVANTAGES - DISADVANTAGES     
Two-sided matching is one of many existing ways to face the assignment 
problem. The advantages of a two-sided matching algorithm’s use are the following: 
 It takes into consideration the preferences of both parties and tries to 
balance them. Actually, in some cases the appearance of those preferences 
does not reflect the real ones as far as potential misrepresentation could be 
beneficial at least for the agents of one side.  However, the application of 
an appropriate strategy could be proven catalytic to this direction.    
 The outcome is stable and it can be an optimal one too. 
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 When ties appear in the preference list, alternative solutions result and can 
be explored, analyzed and evaluated by the decision makers.¹⁴  
 Besides and as far as matching markets are concerned, the consideration of 
both sides’ preferences has a positive effect on the supply and demand 
efficiencies and improves (at least theoretically) the welfare of all 
involved parties.²⁴  
Of course, the application of a two-sided matching algorithm has disadvantages 
too. The major disadvantage is that every agent must fill/submit a complete preference 
list in a ranked order, including every available position and vice versa in order to avoid 
the phenomenon that agents/positions will remain unmatched. Moreover, no two-sided 
matching algorithm can ensure any agent that her top rated priorities will be fulfilled. 
However, the application of strategies like longer preference lists or secondary matching 
rounds would be helpful towards that direction.¹⁴   
D. APPLYING TWO-SIDED MATCHING 
There are many two-sided matching mechanisms that have been applied and are 
still applied for assignment purposes in organizations and generally in markets of a 
different nature. The author chooses three mechanisms of them, with different 
characteristics, advantages and disadvantages to describe and analyze. In the next 
chapter, and after the author comprehends the function of these mechanisms, he applies 
them in order to assign the Hellenic Navy officers to positions. Finally, evaluation and 
comparison of the three mechanisms’ results will take place in order to assist the Hellenic 
Navy’s relevant office in assignment procedure.  
1.  Priority Mechanism 
The Priority mechanism was applied in the UK concerning the assignment of 
students to particular hospital programs. Under this mechanism, a priority to each match 
is assigned based on the submitted preference rankings of sides A (consultant) and B 
(student). According to Unver, when a student i lists a consultant s in the kth spot in 
his/her rank order list and the same consultant lists the student in lth spot, such a (s,i) 
match is called a (k,l) match. The priority of a (k, l) match is the product of the student’s 
ranking of the consultant and consultant’s ranking of the student, that is k x l²⁵. 
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Therefore, in a (1,1) match both sides ranked each other first and the priority number is 1 
(1 x 1); similarly, the matches (1,2) and (2,1) have the same priority, which is 2 and so 
on. After all priorities are assigned, the matches are generated starting from the lowest 
priority number.  
Two versions of the priority mechanism appeared differing in the way that they 
broke ties; the first version (applied in Birmingham) broke ties in the consultant’s favor 
(that is a (1,2) match had a higher priority than a (2,1) match) while the second version 
(applied in Newcastle) broke ties in the student’s favor (that is a (2,1) match had a higher 
priority than a (1,2) match).¹³   
Both versions of the Priority mechanism are unstable, which means there may 
exist a pair (consultant-student in this case) that prefers each other instead of their 
generated partner. Furthermore, they are neither Pareto efficient nor usually strategy 
proof. These negative features in combination with “prior arrangement phenomenon” that 
appeared led to failure and the abandonment of the specific mechanism even though (1,1) 
matches were always realized.   
2. Deferred Acceptance Mechanism (DA) 
The Deferred Acceptance mechanism was proposed by Gale and Shapley (1962) 
using marriage partners for illustration purposes²⁶ and its title emphasizes the technique 
that is followed throughout its application. It was adopted and applied (in its first and 
amended versions) in various labor markets including the education market (school 
choice/college admission). 
Under the specific mechanism, the agents on each side make proposals to the 
agents of the other side according to their preferences. Agents that receive more 
proposals than they can accept keep (but not engages to) the most preferable and reject 
the others. Rejected agents propose again and the new proposals are evaluated; some of 
them are kept and some of them are rejected again including proposals that were held in 
the previous steps, but they are less preferable than the new ones (that means that 
acceptances are deferred throughout the mechanism and until there are no further 
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proposals or until the mechanism’s end). The mechanism is terminated when the rejected 
agents cannot make more proposals and the kept proposals at this step are considered as 
the final ones.¹⁶  
Assuming that there are two groups of agents, A and B, the question is: which 
group’s agents propose and which group’s agents keep, accept or reject the proposals? 
The answer is that for every given market and when the agents of both groups have strict 
preferences, there exists two optimal stable matches, one based on the proposals of the 
first group and another one based on the proposals of the second group.¹³ When the 
agents of group A propose, the result is A-optimal stable matching (each A’s agent likes 
the matching at least as well as any other stable matching) and when the agents of group 
B propose the result is B-optimal stable matching (each B’s agent likes the matching at 
least as well as any other stable matching). Also, the author has to mention that A-
optimal stable matching is the worst case scenario for B’s agents and vice versa.  
The Deferred Acceptance mechanism produces stable matching, which means 
there is no unmatched pair (c, d) where agent c prefers agent d instead of his/her assigned 
partner and he/she has higher priority from the agent (or the agents) of his/her group who 
are assigned to agent d. Furthermore, the mechanism is a strategy-proof one that 
eliminates justified envy. It is important to indicate that the complete elimination of 
justified envy may be in conflict with Pareto efficiency while a potential trade-off 
between stability and Pareto efficiency may appear.¹⁷        
3.  Top Trading Cycles (TTC) Mechanism 
The TTC mechanism’s version that the author examines is introduced by 
Abdulkadiroglu & Sonmez (2003) and is a competing mechanism to the Deferred 
Acceptance algorithm that refers to the school choice/college admission problem. It starts 
with students who have the highest priorities and allows them to trade the schools for 
which they have the highest priorities. Once these students are removed, it proceeds in a 
similar way starting with students who have the highest priorities among those who 
remain. As Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez explain, the mechanism works as follows:¹⁷  
 37 
Step 1:    A counter is assigned for each school (sᵢ) that marks the available seats 
of the school (initially equal to the capacity of school). Each student (iᵢ) points to his/her 
favorite school according to his/her preferences and each school points to the student who 
is first in the school’s priority order. After that, at least one cycle appears, that is an 
ordered list of schools and students; i.e., (s₁, i₃, s₂, i₅). In this case, student i₃ is assigned to 
school s₂ and student i₅ is assigned to school s₁. Each agent (school or student) can be part 
of one cycle at most. Each student that is assigned to a school is removed, and similarly 
each school in which a student is assigned is removed too unless there are more than one 
seat available; in that case, the counter is reduced by one and the school remains active in 
the procedure. All other schools’ counters remain the same. 
Step k:    Each remaining student points to his/her favorite school among the 
remaining schools and each school points to the student who is first in the school’s 
priority order among the remaining students. The procedure is the same as step 1. The 
mechanism terminates whenever all students are assigned to a school or all available 
school seats are covered by students.  
The TTC mechanism, as it is performed by Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, seems to 
function in favor of students; that means when a cycle appears the students are assigned 
to the school that they pointed to. For example, i₃ is assigned to his/her school of 
preference s₁ and i₅ is assigned to s₂. In the next chapter’s example the author is going to 
check the function of the mechanism in favor of schools’ preferences too.  
The TTC mechanism is Pareto efficient (“because no student can be better off 
without hurting someone who left the mechanism in a previous step”¹⁷) and a strategy 
proof mechanism²³; that is, the declaration of students’ true preferences is a dominant 
strategy for them. This happens because in each step the mechanism is based on the 
highest priorities and in a case of misrepresenting preferences the student’s true 
preference will leave the mechanism in a previous step. Thus, a potential manipulation 
will have a negative effect for the student.¹⁷ On the other hand the application of the TTC 
mechanism cannot eliminate justified envy completely.                                                         
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A visual image concerning the three above described two-sided matching 
mechanisms and their attributes is shown in Table 2.  





Stability No Yes No
Strategy proof No Yes Yes
Pareto Efficient No  No* Yes
Complete elimination of 
justified envy





 IV. APPLICATION OF TWO SIDED-MATCHING MECHANISMS 
IN THE HELLENIC NAVY ASSIGNMENT PROCEDURE 
A. ANALYSIS OF THE MECHANISMS 
The author assumes that there are ten positions in the Hellenic Navy (P1, P2, …, 
P10) that have to be covered, and fifteen officers (O1, O2, …, O15) are eligible 
(according to their rank) for the specific assignments. Each position has to be covered by 
one officer except P1, which requires two officers. Each officer has filled the matrix with 
his annual preferences; an overall view with all officers’ preferences appears in the 
following Table 3.   











1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
O1: P3 P2 P5 P9 P1 O9: P2 P9 P8 P1 P6
O2: P4 P8 P6 P7 P10 O10: P3 P2 P1 P4 P9
O3: P3 P2 P8 P1 P7 O11: P2 P1 P10 P7 P6
O4: P2 P1 P4 P10 P6 O12: P1 P8 P10 P7 P5
O5: P8 P4 P1 P7 P10 O13: P3 P2 P9 P4 P10
O6: P8 P4 P6 P1 P5 O14: P3 P2 P1 P6 P5
O7: P2 P5 P1 P4 P6 O15: P9 P4 P7 P6 P1
O8: P9 P8 P4 P6 P7  
 
 
In this specific example and for the creation of this matrix, the positions are 
divided into groups of similar nature (like “off-center” positions, abroad or not, 
commander positions, etc.). The officers’ preferences are based on this division; that 
means an officer who desires to be placed as a commander has as first preferences the 
relative positions, the same happens with an officer who desires to be placed abroad or in 
a domestic “off-center” position, etc.   
Furthermore, another matrix (Table 4) that indicates each position’s “preferences” 
based on the eligible officers is needed. This matrix is created (as explained in Chapter II) 
by taking into consideration the characteristics of each officer (namely, the possession of 
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a master’s degree, the numerical value of his/her experience, and the average of his/her 
evaluation reports) and the specific requirements that each position has. As an example, 
for some positions the order of priorities is experience/possession of a master’s 
degree/evaluation reports while for other positions the order is different according to the 
nature of the position.  































P1: O6 O15 O11 O4 O1 O9 O3 O2 O5 O7 O13 O14 O12 O8 O10
P2: O4 O6 O11 O15 O7 O1 O3 O9 O2 O5 O14 O12 O8 O10 O13
P3: O4 O6 O1 O5 O11 O15 O9 O7 O3 O12 O2 O10 O8 O13 O14
P4: O10 O8 O13 O12 O1 O11 O4 O15 O6 O9 O14 O7 O2 O5 O3
P5: O12 O8 O1 O10 O13 O6 O4 O9 O11 O15 O2 O7 O5 O3 O14
P6: O10 O12 O8 O13 O1 O9 O6 O15 O11 O4 O14 O2 O3 O7 O5
P7: O3 O5 O9 O7 O2 O14 O10 O13 O8 O12 O6 O4 O15 O11 O1
P8: O6 O4 O11 O1 O15 O7 O10 O13 O12 O8 O14 O5 O9 O3 O2
P9: O10 O12 O13 O8 O2 O5 O14 O7 O9 O11 O4 O15 O1 O3 O6
P10: O3 O5 O2 O7 O9 O12 O8 O14 O13 O10 O15 O11 O6 O1 O4
 
 
In this specific example, the officers are divided into groups according to the 
above mentioned characteristics. Consequently, according to the position’s order of 
priorities the respective group of officers is chosen (i.e., if the nature of the position 
requires an order like possession of a master’s degree/experience/evaluation reports then 
the group of officers with a master’s degree will be chosen first, the group of officers 
with the higher level of experience will be chosen second and the group of officers with 
higher average in the evaluation reports will be chosen last). In cases where more officers 
than needed cover the first criterion, the second criterion (and if needed the third 
criterion) will clarify who is going to match to the specific positions. Thus, the criteria 
are not mutually exclusive and an officer may qualify for two or even all of them 
simultaneously.   
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It needs to be clarified that in most cases the connection between a position’s 
requirements and its order of priorities according to the above mentioned characteristics 
is likely to be subjective; thus, the staff of the Department of Personnel has to take into 
account the parameters in order to create the matrix with positions’ “preferences.”  
In this particular example:  
 For P1, P2, and P3 the priority is evaluation reports/possession of a 
master’s degree/ experience. 
 For P4, P5, and P6 the priority is experience, evaluation reports/ 
possession of a master’s degree. 
 For P7 and P10 the priority is possession of a master’s degree/ experience/ 
evaluation reports. 
 For P8 the priority is evaluation reports/experience/possession of a 
master’s degree. 
 For P9 the priority is experience/possession of a master’s degree/ 
evaluation reports. 
 The officers that have a relative advantage in each of the positions 
according to the priorities are shown in Table 4; i.e., for P1, P2 and P3 
positions the officers that have the advantage to cover them are O4, O6, 
O11, O15, O1, etc. 
Having the data of the above tables, the author will apply the three different two-
sided matching mechanisms that are described in the previous chapter in order to match 































P1, O1 5 X 5 = 25 P2, O1 6 X 2 = 12
P1, O2 8 X - = - P2, O2 9 X - = -
P1, O3 7 X 4 = 28 P2, O3 7 X 2 = 14
P1, O4 4 X 2 = 8 P2, O4 1 X 1 = 1
P1, O5 9 X 3 = 27 P2, O5 10 X - = -
P1, O6 1 X 4 = 4 P2, O6 2 X - = -
P1, O7 10 X 3 = 30 P2, O7 5 X 1 = 5
P1, O8 14 X - = - P2, O8 13 X - = -
P1, O9 6 X 4 = 24 P2, O9 8 X 1 = 8
P1, O10 15 X 3 = 45 P2, O10 14 X 2 = 28
P1, O11 3 X 2 = 6 P2, O11 3 X 1 = 3
P1, O12 13 X 1 = 13 P2, O12 12 X - = -
P1, O13 11 X - = - P2, O13 15 X 2 = 30
P1, O14 12 X 3 = 36 P2, O14 11 X 2 = 22






















P3, O1 3 X 1 = 3 P4, O1 5 X - = -
P3, O2 9 X - = - P4, O2 13 X 1 = 13
P3, O3 12 X 1 = 12 P4, O3 15 X - = -
P3, O4 1 X - = - P4, O4 7 X 3 = 21
P3, O5 4 X - = 4 P4, O5 14 X 2 = 28
P3, O6 2 X - = - P4, O6 9 X 2 = 18
P3, O7 7 X - = - P4, O7 12 X 4 = 48
P3, O8 11 X - = - P4, O8 2 X 3 = 6
P3, O9 6 X - = - P4, O9 10 X - = -
P3, O10 10 X 1 = 10 P4, O10 1 X 4 = 4
P3, O11 14 X - = - P4, O11 6 X - = -
P3, O12 8 X - = - P4, O12 4 X - = -
P3, O13 12 X 1 = 12 P4, O13 3 X 4 = 12
P3, O14 15 X 1 = 15 P4, O14 11 X - = -























P5, O1 3 X 3 = 9 P6, O1 5 X - = -
P5, O2 11 X - = - P6, O2 12 X 3 = 36
P5, O3 14 X - = - P6, O3 13 X - = -
P5, O4 7 X - = - P6, O4 10 X 5 = 50
P5, O5 13 X - = - P6, O5 15 X - = -
P5, O6 6 X 5 = 30 P6, O6 7 X 3 = 21
P5, O7 12 X 2 = 24 P6, O7 14 X 5 = 70
P5, O8 12 X - = - P6, O8 3 X 4 = 12
P5, O9 8 X - = - P6, O9 6 X 5 = 30
P5, O10 4 X - = - P6, O10 1 X - = -
P5, O11 9 X - = - P6, O11 9 X 5 = 45
P5, O12 1 X 5 = 5 P6, O12 2 X - = -
P5, O13 5 X - = - P6, O13 4 X - = -
P5, O14 15 X 5 = 75 P6, O14 11 X 4 = 44






















P7, O1 15 X - = - P8, O1 4 X - = -
P7, O2 5 X 4 = 20 P8, O2 15 X 2 = 30
P7, O3 1 X 5 = 5 P8, O3 14 X 3 = 42
P7, O4 12 X - = - P8, O4 2 X - = -
P7, O5 2 X 4 = 8 P8, O5 12 X 1 = 12
P7, O6 11 X - = - P8, O6 1 X 1 = 1
P7, O7 4 X - = - P8, O7 6 X - = -
P7, O8 9 X 5 = 45 P8, O8 10 X 2 = 20
P7, O9 3 X - = - P8, O9 13 X 3 = 39
P7, O10 7 X - = - P8, O10 7 X - = -
P7, O11 14 X 4 = 56 P8, O11 3 X - = -
P7, O12 10 X 4 = - P8, O12 9 X 2 = 18
P7, O13 8 X 5 = 40 P8, O13 8 X - = -
P7, O14 6 X - = - P8, O14 11 X - = -























P9, O1 13 X 4 = 52 P10, O1 14 X - = -
P9, O2 5 X - = - P10, O2 3 X 5 = 15
P9, O3 14 X - = - P10, O3 1 X - = -
P9, O4 11 X - = - P10, O4 15 X 4 = 60
P9, O5 6 X - = - P10, O5 2 X 5 = 10
P9, O6 15 X - = - P10, O6 13 X - = -
P9, O7 8 X - = - P10, O7 4 X - = -
P9, O8 4 X 1 = 4 P10, O8 7 X - = -
P9, O9 9 X 2 = 18 P10, O9 5 X - = -
P9, O10 1 X 5 = 5 P10, O10 10 X 5 = 50
P9, O11 10 X - = - P10, O11 12 X 3 = 36
P9, O12 2 X - = - P10, O12 6 X 3 = 18
P9, O13 3 X 3 = 9 P10, O13 9 X 5 = 45
P9, O14 7 X - = - P10, O14 8 X - = -
P9, O15 12 X 1 = 12 P10, O15 11 X 5 = 55
 
Before the author starts the analysis it is important to mention that in the case of a 
tie, the author breaks it in favor of the positions’ “preferences.” 
Step 1: Taking into account the lowest priority number of each potential match, 
the ranked ordered lists results in the following matches:  
P1, O6 = 4  P2, O4 = 1  P3, O1 = 3  P4, O10= 4   
P5, O12= 5  P6, O8= 12  P7, O3= 5   P8, O6= 1   
P9, O8 = 4  P10, O5= 10 
Step2: P2, P3, P4, P5, P7 and P10 have no immediate competitors. Unlikely, P1 
and P8 have the same first choice; P1 has to concede its first choice to P8 and proposes to 
second-ranked O11. Similarly P6 has to concede its first choice to P9 and propose to its 
second choice, O6. 
P1, O11= 6  P2, O4 = 1  P3, O1 = 3  P4, O10= 4  
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P5, O12= 5  P6, O6= 21  P7, O3= 5   P8, O6= 1   
P9, O8 = 4  P10, O5= 10 
Step 3: P6 proposes to third-ranked O9 because O6 has already been matched. As 
far as P1 is concerned, O11 covers the first of the two available positions. The fourth-
ranked O15 is proposed for the second available position because the previous ranked 
options have already been matched.   
P1, O11= 6  P1, O15= 6  P2, O4 = 1  P3, O1 = 3  
P4, O10= 4   P5, O12= 5  P6, O9= 30  P7, O3= 5   
P8, O6= 1    P9, O8 = 4  P10, O5= 10 
Step 4: P1 matches to O15. P6 proposes and matches to the third-ranked O9.   
P1, O11= 6  P1, O15= 6  P2, O4 = 1  P3, O1 = 3  
P4, O10= 4   P5, O12= 5  P6, O9= 30  P7, O3= 5   
P8, O6= 1    P9, O8 = 4  P10, O5= 10 
The final ranked ordered list resulted in the following matches:  












P2, O4 1 X 1 = 1
P8, O6 1 X 1 = 1
P3, O1 3 X 1 = 3
P4, O10 1 X 4 = 4
P9, O8 4 X 1 = 4
P5, O12 1 X 5 = 5
P7, O3 1 X 5 = 5
P1, O11 3 X 2 = 6
P10, O5 2 X 5 = 10
P1, O15 2 X 5 = 10
P6, O9 6 X 5 = 30
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2. Matching Mechanism Number 2: Deferred Acceptance (DA)  
 Matching based on officers’ preferences 
 Step 1:   O2 and O12 have no immediate competitors, so they engage to 
P4 and P1 respectively. Unlikely O1, O3, O10, O13 and O14 propose to P3; O4, O7, O9 
and O11 propose to P2; O5 and O6 propose to P8; O8 and O15 propose to P9. P3 rejects 
O3, O10, O13 and O14 and keeps O1 engaged; P2 rejects O7, O9 and O11 and keeps O4 
engaged; P8 rejects O5 and keeps O6 engaged; P9 rejects O15 and keeps O8 engaged. 
The author indicates this in the following manner:  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
O12 O4 O1 O2    O6 O8   
Step 2:    O3, O5, O7, O9, O10, O11, O13, O14 and O15 propose to their 
second choice, namely to P2, P4, P5, P9, P2, P1, P2, P2 and P4 respectively. P1 keeps 
O11 engaged for the second available position; P2 rejects O3, O10, O13, and O14 and 
keeps O4 engaged; P4 rejects O2, O5 and keeps O15 engaged; P5 keeps O7 engaged; P9 
rejects O9 and keeps O8 engaged.   
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
               O11, O12 O4 O1 O15 O7   O6 O8   
Step 3:    O2 propose to its second choice (P8) while O3, O5, O9, O10, 
O13 and O14 propose to their third choice, namely to P8, P1, P8, P1, P9 and P1 
respectively. P1 rejects O10,O12 and O14 and keeps O5,O11 engaged; P8 rejects O2, O3, 
O9, and keeps O6 engaged; P9 rejects O8 and keeps O13 engaged. 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
      O5, O11 O4 O1 O15 O7   O6 O13   
Step 4:  O8 and O12 propose to their second choice (P8 both) while O2 
proposes to its third choice (P6) and O3, O9, O10, and O14 propose to their fourth choice 
(P1, P1, P4, and P6 respectively). P1 rejects O3, O5 and keeps O9, O11 engaged; P4 
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rejects O15 and keeps O10 engaged; P6 rejects O2 and keeps O14 engaged; P8 rejects 
O8, O12 and keeps O6 engaged.  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
       O9, O11 O4 O1 O10 O7 O14  O6 O13   
Step 5:    O8, O12, O15 propose to their third choice (P4, P10 and P7 
respectively) while O2, O5 propose to their fourth choice (P7 both) and O3 proposes to 
its fifth choice (P7). P4 rejects O8 and keeps O10 engaged; P7 rejects O2, O5 and O15 
and keeps O3 engaged. P10 is engaged to O12. 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
       O9, O11 O4 O1 O10 O7 O14 O3 O6 O13 O12  
Step 6:    O8, O15 propose to their fourth choice (P6 both) while O2, O5 
and O14 propose to their fifth choice (P10, P10 and P5 respectively). P5 rejects O14 and 
keeps O7 engaged; P6 rejects O15 and keeps O8 engaged; P10 rejects O2, O12 and keeps 
O5 engaged.  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
     O9, O11 O4 O1 O10 O7 O8 O3 O6 O13  O5  
Step 7:    O12 proposes to its fourth choice (P7) while O15 proposes to its 
fifth choice, namely P1. P7 rejects O12 and keeps O3; P1 rejects O9 and keeps O11, O15 
engaged.  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
    O11, O15 O4 O1 O10 O7 O8 O3 O6 O13  O5  
Step 8:    O9 proposes to its fifth choice, namely P6. P6 rejects O9 and 
keeps O8 engaged. O12 proposes to its fifth choice, that is P5. P5 rejects O7 and keeps 
O12 engaged.  
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
     O11,O15 O4 O1 O10 O12 O8 O3 O6 O13  O5  
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Step 9:    O7 proposes to its third choice (P1) but P1 rejects O7 and keeps 
O11, O15 engaged. After that, O7 proposes to its fourth choice (P4) but P4 rejects O7 
and keeps O10 engaged. Finally, O7 proposes to its fifth choice (P6) but P6 rejects O7 
and keeps O8 engaged.  
Consequently, the final matching μ(Ο), which is the matching resulting 
from the procedure driven by the officers’ preferences, is the following:  
Table 6.   Deferred Acceptance Based on Officers’ Preferences Final Matching 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
O11, O15 O4 O1 O10 O12 O8 O3 O6 O13 O5  
 
Furthermore, a visual image of the procedure is as follows.    





















O1: P3 P2 P5 P9 P1 O9: P2 P9 P8 P1 P6
O2: P4 P8 P6 P7 P10 O10: P3 P2 P1 P4 P9
O3: P3 P2 P8 P1 P7 O11: P2 P1 P10 P7 P6
O4: P2 P1 P4 P10 P6 O12: P1 P8 P10 P7 P5
O5: P8 P4 P1 P7 P10 O13: P3 P2 P9 P4 P10
O6: P8 P4 P6 P1 P5 O14: P3 P2 P1 P6 P5
O7: P2 P5 P1 P4 P6 O15: P9 P4 P7 P6 P1

























O1: P3 P2 P5 P9 P1 O9: P2 P9 P8 P1 P6
O2: P4 P8 P6 P7 P10 O10: P3 P2 P1 P4 P9
O3: P3 P2 P8 P1 P7 O11: P2 P1 P10 P7 P6
O4: P2 P1 P4 P10 P6 O12: P1 P8 P10 P7 P5
O5: P8 P4 P1 P7 P10 O13: P3 P2 P9 P4 P10
O6: P8 P4 P6 P1 P5 O14: P3 P2 P1 P6 P5
O7: P2 P5 P1 P4 P6 O15: P9 P4 P7 P6 P1
O8: P9 P8 P4 P6 P7
 





















O1: P3 P2 P5 P9 P1 O9: P2 P9 P8 P1 P6
O2: P4 P8 P6 P7 P10 O10: P3 P2 P1 P4 P9
O3: P3 P2 P8 P1 P7 O11: P2 P1 P10 P7 P6
O4: P2 P1 P4 P10 P6 O12: P1 P8 P10 P7 P5
O5: P8 P4 P1 P7 P10 O13: P3 P2 P9 P4 P10
O6: P8 P4 P6 P1 P5 O14: P3 P2 P1 P6 P5
O7: P2 P5 P1 P4 P6 O15: P9 P4 P7 P6 P1
O8: P9 P8 P4 P6 P7
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O1: P3 P2 P5 P9 P1 O9: P2 P9 P8 P1 P6
O2: P4 P8 P6 P7 P10 O10: P3 P2 P1 P4 P9
O3: P3 P2 P8 P1 P7 O11: P2 P1 P10 P7 P6
O4: P2 P1 P4 P10 P6 O12: P1 P8 P10 P7 P5
O5: P8 P4 P1 P7 P10 O13: P3 P2 P9 P4 P10
O6: P8 P4 P6 P1 P5 O14: P3 P2 P1 P6 P5
O7: P2 P5 P1 P4 P6 O15: P9 P4 P7 P6 P1
O8: P9 P8 P4 P6 P7
 





















O1: P3 P2 P5 P9 P1 O9: P2 P9 P8 P1 P6
O2: P4 P8 P6 P7 P10 O10: P3 P2 P1 P4 P9
O3: P3 P2 P8 P1 P7 O11: P2 P1 P10 P7 P6
O4: P2 P1 P4 P10 P6 O12: P1 P8 P10 P7 P5
O5: P8 P4 P1 P7 P10 O13: P3 P2 P9 P4 P10
O6: P8 P4 P6 P1 P5 O14: P3 P2 P1 P6 P5
O7: P2 P5 P1 P4 P6 O15: P9 P4 P7 P6 P1
O8: P9 P8 P4 P6 P7
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O1: P3 P2 P5 P9 P1 O9: P2 P9 P8 P1 P6
O2: P4 P8 P6 P7 P10 O10: P3 P2 P1 P4 P9
O3: P3 P2 P8 P1 P7 O11: P2 P1 P10 P7 P6
O4: P2 P1 P4 P10 P6 O12: P1 P8 P10 P7 P5
O5: P8 P4 P1 P7 P10 O13: P3 P2 P9 P4 P10
O6: P8 P4 P6 P1 P5 O14: P3 P2 P1 P6 P5
O7: P2 P5 P1 P4 P6 O15: P9 P4 P7 P6 P1
O8: P9 P8 P4 P6 P7
 





















O1: P3 P2 P5 P9 P1 O9: P2 P9 P8 P1 P6
O2: P4 P8 P6 P7 P10 O10: P3 P2 P1 P4 P9
O3: P3 P2 P8 P1 P7 O11: P2 P1 P10 P7 P6
O4: P2 P1 P4 P10 P6 O12: P1 P8 P10 P7 P5
O5: P8 P4 P1 P7 P10 O13: P3 P2 P9 P4 P10
O6: P8 P4 P6 P1 P5 O14: P3 P2 P1 P6 P5
O7: P2 P5 P1 P4 P6 O15: P9 P4 P7 P6 P1
O8: P9 P8 P4 P6 P7
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O1: P3 P2 P5 P9 P1 O9: P2 P9 P8 P1 P6
O2: P4 P8 P6 P7 P10 O10: P3 P2 P1 P4 P9
O3: P3 P2 P8 P1 P7 O11: P2 P1 P10 P7 P6
O4: P2 P1 P4 P10 P6 O12: P1 P8 P10 P7 P5
O5: P8 P4 P1 P7 P10 O13: P3 P2 P9 P4 P10
O6: P8 P4 P6 P1 P5 O14: P3 P2 P1 P6 P5
O7: P2 P5 P1 P4 P6 O15: P9 P4 P7 P6 P1
O8: P9 P8 P4 P6 P7
 





















O1: P3 P2 P5 P9 P1 O9: P2 P9 P8 P1 P6
O2: P4 P8 P6 P7 P10 O10: P3 P2 P1 P4 P9
O3: P3 P2 P8 P1 P7 O11: P2 P1 P10 P7 P6
O4: P2 P1 P4 P10 P6 O12: P1 P8 P10 P7 P5
O5: P8 P4 P1 P7 P10 O13: P3 P2 P9 P4 P10
O6: P8 P4 P6 P1 P5 O14: P3 P2 P1 P6 P5
O7: P2 P5 P1 P4 P6 O15: P9 P4 P7 P6 P1
O8: P9 P8 P4 P6 P7
 
 53 
 Matching based on positions’ requirements 
Step 1:   P5 has no immediate competitors, so it engages to O12. Unlikely 
P1 and P8 propose to O6; P2 and P3 propose to O4; P4, P6 and P9 propose to O10; P7 
and P10 propose to O3. O3 rejects P10 and keeps P7 engaged; O4 rejects P3 and keeps 
P2 engaged; O6 rejects P1 and keeps P8 engaged; O10 rejects P6, P9 and keeps P4 
engaged. 
The author indicates this in the following manner:  
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 O13 O14 O15
- - P7 P2 - P8 - - - P4 - P5 - - -  
Step 2:   P1, P3, P6, P9 and P10 propose to their second choice, namely to 
O15, O6, O12, O12 and O5 respectively. O15 keeps P1 engaged; O5 keeps P10 engaged; 
O6 rejects P3 and keeps P8 engaged; O12 rejects P6, P9 and keeps P5 engaged.   
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 O13 O14 O15
- - P7 P2 P10 P8 - - - P4 - P5 - - P1  
Step 3:    P3, P6 and P9 propose to their third choice, that is, to O1, O8 and 
O13 respectively. O1 keeps P3 engaged; O8 keeps P6 engaged; O13 keeps P9 engaged. 
Furthermore, P1 keeps engaged to O15 but also proposes to its third choice, which is 
O11, because it has one more position available.   
 Consequently, the final matching μ(P), which is the matching resulting 
from the procedure driven by the positions’ requirements, is the following:  
 
Table 16.   Deferred Acceptance Based on Positions’ Preferences Final Matching 
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 O13 O14 O15





Furthermore, a visual image of the procedure is as follows.  































P1: O6 O15 O11 O4 O1 O9 O3 O2 O5 O7 O13 O14 O12 O8 O10
P2: O4 O6 O11 O15 O7 O1 O3 O9 O2 O5 O14 O12 O8 O10 O13
P3: O4 O6 O1 O5 O11 O15 O9 O7 O3 O12 O2 O10 O8 O13 O14
P4: O10 O8 O13 O12 O1 O11 O4 O15 O6 O9 O14 O7 O2 O5 O3
P5: O12 O8 O1 O10 O13 O6 O4 O9 O11 O15 O2 O7 O5 O3 O14
P6: O10 O12 O8 O13 O1 O9 O6 O15 O11 O4 O14 O2 O3 O7 O5
P7: O3 O5 O9 O7 O2 O14 O10 O13 O8 O12 O6 O4 O15 O11 O1
P8: O6 O4 O11 O1 O15 O7 O10 O13 O12 O8 O14 O5 O9 O3 O2
P9: O10 O12 O13 O8 O2 O5 O14 O7 O9 O11 O4 O15 O1 O3 O6
P10: O3 O5 O2 O7 O9 O12 O8 O14 O13 O10 O15 O11 O6 O1 O4  































P1: O6 O15 O11 O4 O1 O9 O3 O2 O5 O7 O13 O14 O12 O8 O10
P2: O4 O6 O11 O15 O7 O1 O3 O9 O2 O5 O14 O12 O8 O10 O13
P3: O4 O6 O1 O5 O11 O15 O9 O7 O3 O12 O2 O10 O8 O13 O14
P4: O10 O8 O13 O12 O1 O11 O4 O15 O6 O9 O14 O7 O2 O5 O3
P5: O12 O8 O1 O10 O13 O6 O4 O9 O11 O15 O2 O7 O5 O3 O14
P6: O10 O12 O8 O13 O1 O9 O6 O15 O11 O4 O14 O2 O3 O7 O5
P7: O3 O5 O9 O7 O2 O14 O10 O13 O8 O12 O6 O4 O15 O11 O1
P8: O6 O4 O11 O1 O15 O7 O10 O13 O12 O8 O14 O5 O9 O3 O2
P9: O10 O12 O13 O8 O2 O5 O14 O7 O9 O11 O4 O15 O1 O3 O6




































P1: O6 O15 O11 O4 O1 O9 O3 O2 O5 O7 O13 O14 O12 O8 O10
P2: O4 O6 O11 O15 O7 O1 O3 O9 O2 O5 O14 O12 O8 O10 O13
P3: O4 O6 O1 O5 O11 O15 O9 O7 O3 O12 O2 O10 O8 O13 O14
P4: O10 O8 O13 O12 O1 O11 O4 O15 O6 O9 O14 O7 O2 O5 O3
P5: O12 O8 O1 O10 O13 O6 O4 O9 O11 O15 O2 O7 O5 O3 O14
P6: O10 O12 O8 O13 O1 O9 O6 O15 O11 O4 O14 O2 O3 O7 O5
P7: O3 O5 O9 O7 O2 O14 O10 O13 O8 O12 O6 O4 O15 O11 O1
P8: O6 O4 O11 O1 O15 O7 O10 O13 O12 O8 O14 O5 O9 O3 O2
P9: O10 O12 O13 O8 O2 O5 O14 O7 O9 O11 O4 O15 O1 O3 O6
P10: O3 O5 O2 O7 O9 O12 O8 O14 O13 O10 O15 O11 O6 O1 O4
 
3. Matching Mechanism Number 3: Top Trading Cycle mechanism  
 
.
CP(1)=2                                                                                                                    P4
P1 P2 P3
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5









P9 P8 P7 P6
  
Figure 13.   Top Trading Cycle Example - Step 1 
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There are two cycles in Step 1: (P2, O4) and (P8, O6). Therefore, officers O4 and 
O6 are assigned to positions P2 and P8 respectively and removed. In addition, positions 
P2 and P8 are removed.   
 
.
CP(1)=2                                                                                                                    P4
P1 P3
O1 O2 O3 O5










Figure 14.   Top Trading Cycle Example - Step 2 
There is one cycle in Step 2, which is (P3, O1). Therefore, officer O1 is assigned 
to position P3 and removed. In addition, position P3 is removed. 
.
CP(1)=2                                                                                                                    P4
P1
O2 O3 O5










Figure 15.   Top Trading Cycle Example - Step 3 
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There is  one cycle  in Step 3, which  is  (P1, O15, P9, and O10). Therefore, 
according to the mechanism officers O10 and O15 are assigned to positions P1 and P9 
respectively and removed. In addition, position P9 is removed while position P1 is 
reduced by one for the next step. However, what happens if the assignments take place in 
favor of schools? In such a case the matching would be (P1, O15) and (P9, O10).                   
.






O13                                                                                               O8
O12 O11 O9
P6                       
P7
 
Figure 16.   Top Trading Cycle Example - Step 4 
There are two cycles in Step 4: (P1, O11) and (P4, O8). Therefore, officers O11 
and O8 are assigned to positions P1 and P4 respectively and removed. In addition, 






O13                                                                                               
O12 O9
P6                       
P7
 
Figure 17.   Top Trading Cycle Example - Step 5 
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There is one cycle in Step 5, which is (P7, O3). Therefore, officer O3 is assigned 






O13                                                                                               
O12 O9
P6                       
 
Figure 18.   Top Trading Cycle Example - Step 6 
There is one cycle in Step 6, which is (P10, O5). Therefore, officer O5 is assigned 






P6                       
 
Figure 19.   Top Trading Cycle Example - Step 7 
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There is one cycle in Step 7, which is (P5, O12). Therefore, officer O12 is 





P6                       
 
Figure 20.   Top Trading Cycle Example - Step 8 
There is one cycle in Step 2, which is (P6, O9). Therefore, officer O9 is assigned 
to position P6 and removed. In addition, position P6 is removed. 
There are no remaining positions and the algorithm is terminated here. The final 
matching is the following:  
 
Table 20.   Top Trading Cycle Final Matching 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10                                      
    O10, O11    O4       O1 O8 O12 O9 O3 O6 O15  O5           
 
By using the amended version of the Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez (2003) TTC 
mechanism, functioning in favor of positions the final matching is the following: 
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Table 21.   Top Trading Cycle in Favor of Positions’ Final Matching 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10                                      




Three different matching mechanisms are applied in order to match fifteen Greek 
officers to ten specific positions of the Hellenic Navy. Before analyzing the results it 
would be helpful to highlight some interesting points coming from the two-sided 
matching theory due to the above mentioned application in combination with the specific 
nature of the military environment:   
1. Highlighted Points  
 The application of a two-sided matching model in the Hellenic Navy can 
be a one-to-one model (i.e., commanders or commanding/executive 
officers’ assignments) or a many -to-one model (i.e., assignment of 
superior officers in ships). In the specific example the author chooses a 
simple many-to-one model with few one-to-one positions and one position 
covered by more than one officer. 
 Both officers and positions have strict preferences. 
 It is not possible to evaluate the rationality of the matching. The reason is 
that the officers’ preference lists allow them to complete just few 
acceptable positions so it cannot be said for sure if they are finally 
assigned to one of them. Nevertheless, the option for an officer to remain 
unassigned in the case of unacceptable matching does not exist, thus 
he/she has to accept it whether he/she is happy or not.  
 In my opinion every two-sided matching model applied in the Hellenic 
Navy assignment procedure seems to be strategy proof, which means that 
officers’ and positions’ preference lists contain true and not 
misrepresenting information. That is definitely logical for the positions’ 
side. The reason that takes place in the officers’ side is because in case of 
misrepresenting information, the true preferable matching of an officer 
would leave the model in a previous step and not give him/her the option 
to be its mate. From my experience that is the rule, but exceptions can also 
appear; an officer who is well informed about other officers’ behavior and 
preferences would maybe prefer not to state truly the order of his/her 
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preferences because he/she thinks that for some reasons he/she will not be 
assigned to one of them. Thus, the author accepts the strategy proof in the 
Hellenic Navy’s assignment process as “anecdotal evidence” by the time 
that this has not been scientifically measured or proved nor studied. 
 Justified envy can be completely eliminated just in the Deferred 
Acceptance mechanism based on positions’ preferences. But we have to 
mention that, the attempt to eliminate justified envy completely might 
affect (trade off) the stability and the optimality of the mechanism. 
2. Comparison of the Mechanisms’ Results 
The comparison of the three mechanisms’ final results shows that:  
 The three mechanisms have six common pairs out of eleven, namely (P2, 
O4), (P3, O1), (P5, O12), (P7, O3), (P8, O6) and (P10, O5).  
 Just two of the common pairs {(P2, O4), (P8, O6)} are (1,1).  
 Priority mechanism’s final matching is unstable because there are pairs of 
agents, i.e., (P1, O4), (P6, O6), that have not been assigned to each other 
even though they preferred it rather than their match, and thus it is said 
that they block the mechanism. The instability means that positions that 
require specific criteria covered by officers not qualified enough (i.e., P6 
requires great experience but it is covered by its 8
th
 choice, O15, namely 
by an officer without it or with less experience than needed).  
 The two versions of the Deferred Acceptance mechanism have identical 
results. That means that each position is covered by exactly the same 
officer; even the two officers that cover P1 are exactly the same. 
Furthermore, the final matching is stable; there are no blocking pairs but 
just individual blocking agents (absolutely logical in such a great 
example). That means that priorities are followed and positions are 
covered by qualified officers. 
 P1’s both available positions are matched to officers by applying all the 
type of mechanisms. O11 is the first officer who covers P1 in all 
mechanisms while the second officer is O15 in four cases and O10 in one 
case (TTC).  
 The Deferred Acceptance mechanism’s final pairs are more favorable to 
the positions’ preferences than the officers’ preferences. In five pairs the 
officer was the (respective) position’s first choice, in two pairs the 
position’s second choice, and in four pairs the position’s third choice. 
Reversely, in three pairs the position was the officer’s first choice, in one 
pair the officer’s second choice, in one pair the officer’s third choice, in 
two pairs the officer’s fourth choice, and in four pairs the officer’s fifth 
choice. As far as the priority and the Top Trading Cycle mechanisms are 
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concerned their final pairs seem more balanced between positions’ and 
officers’ preferences than the Deferred Acceptance final pairs. 
 As far as Top Trading Cycle mechanism is concerned the final matching is 
unstable for both versions wit blocking pairs. This instability means that 
positions that require specific criteria are covered by not qualified officers. 
 In general, from the positions’ perspective the final pairs extracted from 
the Deferred Acceptance mechanism are likely to be more favorable, 
while from the officers’ perspective the results extracted from the three 
mechanisms are similar and the differences insignificant. 
     
C. FEW MORE EXAMPLES 
So far, the author has tried to describe the application of various two-sided 
matching mechanisms in a usual assignment problem, concerning ten positions and 
fifteen officers of the Hellenic Navy according to each side’s preferences.  Important 
conclusions were extracted and the comparison of the mechanisms’ results revealed the 
advantages and disadvantages of each one. Subsequently, the author is going to extend 
his analysis by providing a few examples that will try to cover possible situations that 
may appear in the initial assignment problem. The author is going to use the same 
mechanisms but have a parameter change each time. 
1. All Officers Have the Same First Two Preferences 
The author assumes that all officers have the same priority preferences, i.e., a 
position abroad. If the positions abroad are P2 and P3 then a potential table with the 











1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
O1: P3 P2 P5 P9 P1 O9: P3 P2 P9 P8 P1
O2: P3 P2 P4 P8 P6 O10: P3 P2 P1 P4 P10
O3: P3 P2 P8 P1 P7 O11: P3 P2 P1 P10 P7
O4: P3 P2 P1 P4 P10 O12: P3 P2 P1 P8 P10
O5: P3 P2 P8 P4 P1 O13: P3 P2 P9 P4 P10
O6: P3 P2 P8 P4 P6 O14: P3 P2 P1 P6 P5
O7: P3 P2 P5 P1 P4 O15: P3 P2 P9 P4 P7
O8: P3 P2 P9 P8 P4
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The first two preferences of each officer change (become P2, P3 and vice versa) 
and the remaining three stay in the previous order. Also, each position’s priorities and the  
table with positions’ preferences remain the same. The results are as follows: 












P2, O4 1 X 1 = 1
P8, O6 1 X 3 = 3
P3, O5 4 X 1 = 4
P4, O10 1 X 4 = 4
P7, O3 1 X 5 = 5
P9, O13 3 X 3 = 9
P5, O1 3 X 3 = 9
P1, O11 3 X 3 = 9
P10, O12 6 X 5 = 30
P1, O9 6 X 5 = 30
P6, O14 11 X 4 = 44  
 Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism 
Matching based on officers’ preferences: 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
O9, O11 O4 O6 O10 O1 O14 O3 O12 O13 O2  
Matching based on positions’ requirements: 
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 O13 O14 O15
P5 - P7 P2 P10 P3 P8 - P1 P4 P1 - P9 P6 -  
 
 Top Trading Cycle mechanism 
 
             P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10                                      
                
     O10, O11    O4       O6 O8 O1 O14 O3 O12 O15 O13 
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 Matching under TTC in favor of positions: 
       P1            P2        P3      P4       P5      P6        P7      P8      P9    P10 
      O11, O15     O4       O6     O8     O12     O13       O3     O1     O10   O2  
  By evaluating the results the author sees that in most cases (except priority 
mechanism) P2 and P3, which were the “apples of discord” for the officers, are covered 
by O4 and O6 respectively. It is important to mention that these two officers were the 
first choices of P2 and P3 as well.  
2.  Few Positions are not Preferred by any Officer 
The author assumes that P5, P7 and P9 are not in the preference list of any officer. 












1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
O1: P3 P2 P8 P10 P1 O9: P2 P3 P8 P1 P6
O2: P4 P8 P6 P10 P3 O10: P3 P2 P1 P4 P10
O3: P3 P2 P8 P1 P10 O11: P2 P1 P10 P8 P6
O4: P2 P1 P4 P10 P6 O12: P1 P6 P2 P3 P10
O5: P8 P4 P1 P6 P3 O13: P3 P2 P10 P4 P6
O6: P8 P4 P6 P1 P10 O14: P3 P2 P1 P6 P4
O7: P2 P10 P1 P4 P6 O15: P10 P4 P2 P6 P8
O8: P10 P8 P4 P6 P2  
Each position’s priorities and the table with positions’ preferences remain the 
same. The results are as follows: 
 Priority mechanism (break the ties in favor of positions) 
In such a case, the Priority mechanism is not useful because priorities for 
the pairs that contain the specific positions (zero priority number) cannot be assigned. 
Therefore, the generation of matches can be done but it will not include P5, P7 and P10, 
and another mechanism must be applied in order to cover those positions.  
 Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism 
Matching based on officers’ preferences: 
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Following this mechanism P5, P7 and P9 are not assigned to an officer. 
The mechanism generates matches for the other positions. 
Matching based on officers’ preferences:  
The assignment takes place regularly and it concerns all positions. The 
matching pairs are the following: 
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 O13 O14 O15
P3 - P10 P2 P7 P8 - P5 - P4 P1 P6 P9 - P1  
 Top Trading Cycle mechanism 
The assignment of P5, P7 and P9 is not possible. 
By evaluating the results it can be seen that only by using Deferred 
Acceptance (based on positions’ preferences) one could achieve the matching of the 
positions that do not exist in any officer’s preference list.  
3. All Officers Have Exactly the Same Preferences  
 The author assumes that all officers have exactly the same preferences, which 
means that five positions are not preferred by any officer, i.e., P1, P2, P4, P7 and P9. 
Such an extreme case is an extension of the previous one; a potential table with the 











1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
O1: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O9: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
O2: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O10: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
O3: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O11: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
O4: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O12: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
O5: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O13: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
O6: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O14: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
O7: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O15: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
O8: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
 
Each position’s priorities and the table with positions’ preferences remain the same. The 
results are as follows: 
 Priority mechanism- Deferred Acceptance based on officers’ preferences- 
Top Trading Cycle mechanism 
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In such an extreme case, these mechanisms are not useful because they  
cannot assign priorities for the non-preferable positions P1, P2, P4, P7 and P9. Therefore, 
the generation of matches can be done only for P3, P5, P6, P8 and P10. 
 Deferred Acceptance based on positions’ preferences 
This is the only mechanism that may (but not for sure) generate matches 
for all positions. The matching pairs in this specific example are the following: 
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 O13 O14 O15
  -   - P10 P3 P7 P8 P2 P4   - P6 P1 P6 P9 - P1
 
If for example the non-preferable positions were P1, P4, P5, P7 and P10, 
this mechanism would not generate matching for all positions. Generally, in such a case, 
if all positions are matched except two or more non-preferable positions, which are being 
deferred for the same officer, then the mechanism does not have a solution.    
4. All Positions Have the Same First Three Preferences but in a 
Different Order 
The author assumes that all positions have the same priority preferences, so they 
prefer the same three officers who possess a master’s degree, have the greatest level of 
experience and perfect evaluation reports. Therefore, the three officers have exactly the 
same skills and their rank in the positions’ preference list can vary. If these officers are 































P1: O9 O15 O2 O4 O1 O6 O3 O11 O5 O7 O13 O14 O12 O8 O10
P2: O2 O9 O15 O6 O7 O1 O3 O4 O11 O5 O14 O12 O8 O10 O13
P3: O15 O2 O9 O5 O11 O4 O6 O7 O3 O12 O1 O10 O8 O13 O14
P4: O15 O2 O9 O12 O1 O11 O4 O10 O6 O13 O14 O7 O8 O5 O3
P5: O9 O15 O2 O10 O13 O6 O4 O12 O11 O8 O1 O7 O5 O3 O14
P6: O9 O15 O2 O13 O1 O10 O6 O8 O11 O4 O14 O12 O3 O7 O5
P7: O15 O9 O2 O8 O3 O14 O10 O13 O7 O12 O6 O4 O15 O11 O1
P8: O9 O2 O15 O1 O6 O7 O10 O13 O12 O8 O14 O5 O4 O3 O2
P9: O2 O15 O9 O8 O12 O5 O14 O7 O13 O11 O4 O10 O1 O3 O6
P10: O2 O9 O15 O7 O3 O12 O8 O14 O13 O10 O5 O11 O6 O1 O4  
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The first three preferences of each position change (become O2, O9 and O15). 
The rest remain the same except the previous first priorities of each position, which are 
put in O2, O9, and O15’s previous positions. In addition, each position’s priorities and 
the table with officers’ preferences remain the same. The results are as follows: 











P4, O15 1 X 2 = 2
P9, O8 4 X 1 = 4
P10, O2 1 X 5 = 5
P2, O7 5 X 1 = 5
P8, O6 5 X 1 = 5
P1, O4 4 X 2 = 8
P3, O3 9 X 1 = 9
P1, O12 13 X 1 = 13
P5, O1 11 X 3 = 33
P6, O14 11 X 4 = 44
P7, O5 13 X 4 = 52  
 Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism 
Matching based on officers’ preferences: 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
O4, O11 O9 O3 O2 O1 O8 O5 O6 O15 O12  
Matching based on positions’ preferences: 
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 O13 O14 O15
P1 P4   - P1 P3 P8 P10 P7 P2   P5 - P6 - - P9  
 
 Top Trading Cycle mechanism 
 
 
                     P1   P2   P3 P4 P5  P6 P7 P8 P9  P10                                      
                
     O4, O10      O9       O1 O2 O7 O6 O8 O5 O15 O13 
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Top Trading Cycle mechanism in favor of positions: 
 
                        P1         P2      P3        P4         P5        P6        P7  P8 P9 P10                                      
               
        O4, O6      O9     O5      O15      O10      O13       O8  O1 O2 O7           
 
By evaluating the results it can be seen that in most cases O2, O9 and O15, which 
were the “apples of discord” for the positions, are assigned to P4, P2 and P9 respectively. 
It is important to mention that there is no (1, 1) matching. That happens because even 
though P4, P2, and P9 are the first priorities of O2, O9 and O15 respectively, each officer 
is the second priority of the assigned position. 
5. All Positions Have Exactly the Same First Five Preferences 
The author assumes that five officers are qualified in such a way that they are the 
first choices of each position; that means that each position has exactly the same (first 
five) preferences, i.e., O1, O2, O4, O7 and O9 with this specific order. Such an extreme 
case is an extension of the previous one, and number five is chosen because each officer 
can fill five preferable positions in his/her annual list. A potential table with the 































P1: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O6 O3 O11 O5 O7 O13 O14 O12 O8 O10
P2: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O15 O3 O6 O11 O5 O14 O12 O8 O10 O13
P3: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O5 O6 O15 O3 O12 O11 O10 O8 O13 O14
P4: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O11 O12 O10 O6 O13 O14 O15 O8 O5 O3
P5: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O6 O15 O12 O11 O8 O13 O10 O5 O3 O14
P6: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O10 O6 O8 O11 O14 O15 O12 O3 O13 O5
P7: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O14 O10 O13 O15 O12 O6 O3 O5 O11 O8
P8: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O15 O10 O13 O12 O8 O14 O6 O5 O3 O11
P9: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O5 O14 O12 O13 O11 O15 O10 O8 O3 O6
P10: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O12 O8 O14 O11 O10 O5 O13 O6 O15 O4  
Each position’s priorities and the table with officers’ preferences remain the same. 
The results are as follows: 
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P3, O1 1 X 1 = 1
P4, O2 2 X 3 = 2
P1, O4 3 X 2 = 6
P5, O7 2 X 4 = 8
P9, O9 5 X 2 = 10
P8, O6 12 X 1 = 12
P1, O12 13 X 1 = 13
P2, O3 7 X 2 = 14
P7, O15 9 X 3 = 27
P6, O8 8 X 4 = 32
P10, O10 10 X 5 = 50  
 Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism 
Matching based on officers’ preferences: 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
O3, O11 O4 O1 O2 O7 O6 O15 O12 O9 O11  
Matching based on positions’ preferences: 
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 O13 O14 O15
P3 P4  P1 P2 - P1 P5  - P9  P6 - P10 - P7 P8  
 
 Top Trading Cycle mechanism 
 
                       P1 P2 P3 P4 P5  P6 P7 P8 P9  P10                                      
                
     O3, O14      O4       O1 O2 O7 O8 O15 O6 O9 O12 
 
Top Trading Cycle mechanism in favor of positions: 
 
                         P1        P2      P3        P4         P5        P6        P7  P8 P9 P10                                      
               
        O3, O6      O4     O1        O2         O7       O8      O14 O15 O9 O12        
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 In this case it is impressive to mention that the five preferable officers (O1, O2, 
O4, O7 and O9) are assigned to the same positions using any mechanism (except O4 in 
the Priority mechanism). Furthermore, in any (extreme) case where the positions’ 
preference list has more than the above mentioned five officers in the exact order, the 
assignment of the first five officers remain the same.   
6. All Officers Have Exactly the Same Preferences and All Positions 
Have Exactly the Same First Five Preferences  











1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
O1: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O9: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
O2: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O10: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
O3: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O11: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
O4: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O12: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
O5: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O13: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
O6: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O14: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
O7: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10 O15: P3 P5 P8 P6 P10
































P1: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O6 O3 O11 O5 O7 O13 O14 O12 O8 O10
P2: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O15 O3 O6 O11 O5 O14 O12 O8 O10 O13
P3: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O5 O6 O15 O3 O12 O11 O10 O8 O13 O14
P4: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O11 O12 O10 O6 O13 O14 O15 O8 O5 O3
P5: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O6 O15 O12 O11 O8 O13 O10 O5 O3 O14
P6: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O10 O6 O8 O11 O14 O15 O12 O3 O13 O5
P7: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O14 O10 O13 O15 O12 O6 O3 O5 O11 O8
P8: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O15 O10 O13 O12 O8 O14 O6 O5 O3 O11
P9: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O5 O14 O12 O13 O11 O15 O10 O8 O3 O6
P10: O1 O2 O4 O7 O9 O12 O8 O14 O11 O10 O5 O13 O6 O15 O4  
In such a case the only mechanism that may be applied is the Deferred 
Acceptance mechanism based on positions’ preferences, but there is no guarantee that a 
final matching will take place. In the positions’ table, if in the sixth preference two  
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positions prefer the same officer that means that there is no solution because there is no 
way of deference. In this particular example that does not happen, thus the final matching 
is as follows:  
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 O13 O14 O15
P3 P5  P1 P8 P9 P1 P6   - P10   P6   P4   -  -  P7 P2
 
However, if for example any position (except P3, P5, P6, P8, and P10 which are 
matched at the first five steps) had as its sixth preference the same one with P1, which is 
O6, then the mechanism would not be continued; similarly if any position had as its sixth 
preference the same one with P2, which is O15, etc. Therefore, in this case the matching 
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V. EVALUATION OF RESULTS - SCORING METHODS 
A.  APPLICATION OF SCORING METHODS 
In the previous chapters the author thoroughly described two-sided matching 
theory and focused on three of its mechanisms—Priority, Deferred Acceptance and Top 
Trading Cycle. The purpose was to apply them in the Hellenic Navy’s assignment 
process and extract useful conclusions. For that reason, the author assumed an example 
where 15 Hellenic Navy officers (O1, O2…,O15) were eligible as candidates for 10 
positions (P1, P2…,P10). The author tried to reflect a real situation as possible by: 
 Creating a table that contained officers’ annual preference list based on the 
positions’ division in groups of similar nature; that means that every 
officer who had as first priority a specific position had as second and third 
priorities the positions of the same group.  
 Creating a table that contained each position’s preference list based on the 
eligible officers; officers were divided in groups according to specific 
characteristics, namely previous performance, possession of a master’s 
degree (as an indicator of their educational level) and experience.  
 Trying to apply many different cases; for that reason the author assumed 
that the positions had various priorities. 
 Assuming that the above mentioned criteria were not mutually exclusive, 
so an officer could be qualified for more than one simultaneously.  
 Considering that the majority of the positions needed one officer so as to 
be covered but there was a position that needed two officers.  
The final matching between officers and positions for each mechanism were: 











P2, O4 1 X 1 = 1
P8, O6 1 X 1 = 1
P3, O1 3 X 1 = 3
P4, O10 1 X 4 = 4
P9, O8 4 X 1 = 4
P5, O12 1 X 5 = 5
P7, O3 1 X 5 = 5
P1, O11 3 X 2 = 6
P10, O5 2 X 5 = 10
P1, O15 2 X 5 = 10
P6, O9 6 X 5 = 30  
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 Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism 
Matching based on officers’ preferences: 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
O15 O4 O1 O10 O12 O8 O3 O6 O13 O5  
Matching based on positions’ requirements: 
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 O13 O14 O15
P3 - P7 P2 P10 P8 - P6 - P4 P1 P5 P9 - P1  
 
 
 Top Trading Cycle (TTC) mechanism 
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 
    O10, O11    O4       O1 O8 O12 O9 O3 O6 O15  O5 
 
Matching under TTC in favor of positions: 
       P1           P2        P3        P4         P5      P6        P7      P8       P9      P10 
     O11, O15    O4       O1 O8 O12 O9 O3 O6 O10 O5 
 
In the previous chapter the author evaluated and compared the results according to 
two-sided matching theory. He mentioned the common points and explained the 
differences that resulted; that is, he focused on theory. That is one point of view. The 
other point of view says that in order to choose the best applicable mechanism a scoring 
method is needed, a method based on mathematical formulas or statistical parameters that 
will indicate the appropriate mechanism so as to apply it in the Hellenic Navy’s 
assignment process. The author will try to achieve this by using the following three main 
scoring methods (nine versions in total).  
1.  Arithmetic Mean 
The first scoring method is based on the arithmetic mean and the author uses this 
statistical parameter in four different ways. The first version is based on the sum of each 
officer’s place in the position’s preference list, for every matching pair; the second one is 
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based on the sum of each position’s place in the officer’s preference list for every 
matching pair; the third one is based on both the above mentioned sums while the fourth 
one is based on the sum of the partial scores (partial score is the product between the 
number that represents the officer’s place in the position’s preference list and the number 
that represents the position’s place in the officer’s preference list for every matching 
pair). Comparing the final scores of all mechanisms (Deferred Acceptance is consider as 
one mechanism because its two versions have identical final matching) the author 
concludes that the mechanism with the lowest final score is the “winner.” Thus, the 
results by applying this method in four different versions are as follows: 
 Using the sum of officer’s place in the position’s preference list: 
Priority mechanism 
(1+ 1+ 3+ 1+ 4+ 1+ 1+ 3+ 2+ 2+ 6)/11= 25/11= 2.27  
Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism 
(3+ 2+ 1+ 3+ 1+ 1+ 3+ 1+ 1+ 3+ 2)/11= 21/11= 1.9  
Top Trading Cycle mechanism (TTC) 
(15+ 3+ 1+ 3+ 2+ 1+ 6+ 1+ 1+ 12+ 2)/11= 47/11= 4.27  
Matching under TTC in favor of positions: 
(3+ 2+ 1+ 3+ 2+ 1+ 6+ 1+ 1+ 1+ 2)/11= 23/11= 2.09  
 Using the sum of position’s place in the officer’s preference list: 
Priority mechanism 
(1+ 1+ 1+ 4+ 1+ 5+ 5+ 2+ 5+ 5+ 5)/11= 35/11= 3.18  
Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism 
(2+ 5+ 1+ 1+ 4+ 5+ 4+ 5+ 1+ 3+ 5)/11= 36/11= 3.27  
Top Trading Cycle mechanism (TTC) 
(3+ 2+ 1+ 1+ 3+ 5+ 5+ 5+ 1+ 1+ 5)/11= 32/11= 2.91  
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Matching under TTC in favor of positions: 
(2+ 5+ 1+ 1+ 3+ 5+ 5+ 5+ 1+ 5+ 5)/11= 38/11= 3.45  
 Using both above mentioned sums: 
Priority mechanism 
[(1+ 1)+ (1+ 1)+ (3+ 1)+ (1+ 4)+ (4+ 1)+ (1+ 5)+ (3+ 2)+ (1+ 5)+ (2+ 5)+ 
(2+ 5)+ (6+ 5)]/11= 60/11= 5.45  
Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism 
[(2+ 5)+ (3+ 2)+ (1+ 1)+ (3+ 1)+ (1+ 4)+ (1+ 5)+ (3+ 4)+ (1+ 5)+ (1+ 1)+ 
(3+ 3)+ (2+ 5)]=57/11= 5.18   
Top Trading Cycle mechanism (TTC) 
[(15+ 3)+ (3+ 2)+ (1+ 1)+ (3+ 1)+ (2+ 3)+ (1+ 5)+ (6+5)+ (1+ 5)+ (1+ 1)+ 
(12+ 1)+ (2+ 5)]= 79/11= 7.18 
Matching under TTC in favor of positions: 
[(2+ 5)+ (3+ 2)+ (1+ 1)+ (3+ 1)+ (2+ 3)+ (1+ 5)+ (6+ 5)+ (1+ 5)+ (1+ 1)+ 
(1+ 5)+ (2+ 5)]= 61/11=5.55 
 
 Using partial scores 
Priority mechanism 
[(1x1)+ (1x1)+ (3x1)+ (1x4)+ (4x1)+ (1x5)+ (3x2)+ (1x5)+ (2x5)+ (2x5)+ 
(6x5)]/11= (1+ 1+ 3+ 4+ 4+ 5+ 5+ 6+ 10+ 10+ 30)/11= 79/11= 7.18 
Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism 
[(2x5)+ (3x2)+ (1x1)+ (3x1)+ (1x4)+ (1x5)+ (3x4)+ (1x5)+ (1x1)+ (3x3)+ 
(2x5)]/11= (10+ 6+ 1+ 3+ 4+ 5+ 12+ 5+ 1+ 9+ 10)/11 =66/11= 6 
Top Trading Cycle mechanism (TTC) 
[(15x3)+(3x2)+(1x1)+(3x1)+(2x3)+ (1x5)+ (6x5)+ (1x5)+ (1x1)+ (12x1)+ 
(2x5)]/11= (45+ 6+ 1+ 3+ 6+ 5+ 30+ 5+ 1+ 12+ 10)/11 =134/11= 12.18 
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Matching under TTC in favor of positions: 
[(2x5)+(3x2)+ (1x1)+ (3x1)+(2x3)+ (1x5)+(6x5)+ (1x5)+ (1x1)+(1x5)+ 
(2x5)] = (10+ 6+ 1+ 3+ 6+ 5+ 30+ 5+ 1+ 5+ 10)/11 = 82/11= 7.45  
Comparing the extracted arithmetic means, we mention that the Deferred 
Acceptance (DA) mechanism is the most preferable one in the three of four versions, the 
priority mechanism is the second preferable while the Top Trading Cycle in favor of 
positions’ requirements and the Top Trading Cycle mechanism come next.  
2.  Median 
There is no doubt that the arithmetic mean is the single most popular and useful 
measure of central location. Its greatest disadvantage is that it is very sensitive to 
“extreme values.” Therefore, we are going to try another method that is less sensitive to 
extreme values to measure the central location, the median. The median equals the 
observation that falls in the middle if all the observations are placed in order. In a case of 
an even number of observations the median equals the average of the two observations 
that fall in the middle.²⁷ The results by applying this method using the partial scores are 
the following:  
 Priority mechanism: 
1
st
 obs: 1x1= 1 2
nd
 obs: 1x1= 1 3rd obs:3x1= 3  
4
th
 obs: 1x4= 4 5
th
 obs: 4x1= 4 6
th
 obs:1x5= 5 
7
th
 obs: 3x2= 6 8
th
 obs: 1x5= 5 9
th
 obs:2x5= 10 
10
th
 obs: 2x5= 10 11
th
 obs: 6x5= 30    
The order is: 1, 1, 3, 4, 4, 5, 5, 6, 10, 10, 30                  median is 5 
 Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism: 
1
st
 obs: 2x5= 10 2
nd
 obs: 3x2= 6  3
rd
 obs:1x1= 1  
4
th 
obs: 3x1= 3 5
th
 obs: 1x4= 4  6
th
 obs: 1x5= 5 
7
th
 obs: 3x4= 12 8
th
 obs: 1x5= 5  9
th
 obs: 1x1= 1 
10
th
 obs: 3x3= 10 11
th
 obs: 2x5= 10    
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The order is: 1, 1, 3, 4, 5, 5, 6, 10, 10, 10, 12                median is 5 
 Top Trading Cycle mechanism (TTC): 
1
st
 obs: 15x3= 45 2
nd
 obs: 3x2= 6  3
rd
 obs:1x1= 1  
4
th
 obs: 3x1= 3 5
th
 obs: 2x3= 6  6
th
 obs: 1x5= 5 
7
th
 obs: 6x5= 30 8
th
 obs: 1x5= 5  9
th
 obs: 1x1= 1 
10
th
 obs: 12x1= 10 11
th
 obs: 2x5= 10    
The order is: 1, 1, 3, 5, 5, 6, 6, 10, 10, 30, 45                median is 6 
Matching under TTC in favor of positions: 
1
st
 obs: 2x5= 45 2
nd
 obs: 3x2= 6  3
rd
 obs:1x1= 1  
4
th
 obs: 3x1= 3 5
th
 obs: 2x3= 6  6
th
 obs: 1x5= 5 
7
th
 obs: 6x5= 30 8
th
 obs: 1x5= 5  9
th
 obs: 1x1= 1 
10
th
 obs: 1x5= 5 11
th
 obs: 2x5= 10    
The order is: 1, 1, 3, 5, 5, 5, 6, 6, 10, 30, 45                  median is 5 
The results show that three of the four mechanisms have exactly the same median; 
that means that this scoring method is not appropriate in order to evaluate the two-sided 
matching mechanisms.  
3.  Standard Deviation 
The third scoring method is based on statistics too and it concerns the standard 
deviation. This measure shows how far a set of numbers is spread out. The standard 
deviation equals to the square root of a fraction that has as a numerator the sum of all 
squared differences between each value and the mean, and as a denominator the number 
of “observations.”²⁷ The author applies again four versions of this scoring method by 
using the same parameters as he did in the first one (arithmetic mean). The mechanism 
with the lowest standard deviation will be the preferable one. Thus, the results by 
applying this method are the following: 
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 Using the sum of officer’s place in the position’s preference list: 
Priority mechanism 
Mean = 2.27 
[(1–2.27)² +(1–2.27)²+ (3–2.27)²+(1–2.27)²+ (4–2.27)²+ (1–2.27)²+(1–
2.27)² + (3–2.27)² + (2–2.27)² + (2–2.27)² + (6–2.27)²]/ 11 =  
(1.61+ 1.61+ 0.53+ 1.61+ 2.99+ 1.61+1.61+0.53+ 0.07+ 0.07+ 13.91)/11= 26.15/ 11 = 
2.38   
σ= √2.38 = 1.54   
Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism 
Mean = 1.9 
[(3–1.9)² +(2–1.9)²+ (1–1.9)²+(3–1.9)²+ (1–1.9)²+ (1–1.9)²+(3–1.9)² + (1–
1.9)² + (1–1.9)² + (3–1.9)² + (2–1.9)²]/ 11 =  
(1.21+ 0.01+ 0.81+ 1.21+ 0.81+ 0.81+1.21+0.81+ 0.81+ 1.21+ 0.01)/11 = 8.91/ 11 = 0.81   
σ= √0.81 = 0.9   
Top Trading Cycle mechanism (TTC) 
Mean = 4.27 
[(15–4.27)²+(3–4.27)²+(1–4.27)²+(3–4.27)²+ (2–4.27)²+(1–4.27)²+(6–
4.27)²+ (1–4.27)²+ (1–4.27)²+ (12–4.27)²+ (2–4.27)²]/11= 
(115.13+ 1.61+ 10.69+ 1.61+ 5.15+ 10.69+ 2.99+ 10.69+ 10.69+ 59.75+ 5.15)/11= 
234.15/11= 21.29 
σ= √21.29 = 4.61   
Matching under TTC in favor of positions: 
Mean = 2.09 
[(3–2.09)²+ (2–2.09)²+(1–2.09)²+(3–2.09)²+(2–2.09)²+ (1–2.09)²+ (6–
2.09)²+ (1–2.09)²+ (1–2.09)²+ (1–2.09)²+ (2–2.09)²]/11= 
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(0.83+ 0.01+1.19+0.83+ 0.01+ 1.19+ 15.29+ 1.19+ 1.19+ 1.19+0.01)/ 11=22.93/11= 2.08 
σ= √2.08 = 1.44   
 Using the sum of position’s place in the officer’s preference list: 
Priority mechanism 
Mean = 3.18 
[(1–3.18)²+(1–3.18)²+(1–3.18)²+(4–3.18)²+ (1–3.18)²+ (5–3.18)²+ (5–
3.18)²+ (2–3.18)²+ (5–3.18)²+ (5–3.18)²+ (5–3.18)²]/11 = 
(4.75+ 4.75+ 4.75+ 0.67+ 4.75+ 3.31+ 3.31+ 1.39+ 3.31+ 3.31+ 3.31)/11=37.61/11= 3.42 
σ= √3.42 = 1.85   
Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism 
Mean = 3.27 
[(2–3.27)²+(5–3.27)²+(1–3.27)²+(1–3.27)²+ (4–3.27)²+ (5–3.27)²+ (4–
3.27)²+ (5–3.27)²+ (1–3.27)²+ (3–3.27)²+ (5–3.27)²]/11= 
(1.61+ 2.99+5.15+ 5.15+ 0.53+ 2.99+ 0.53+ 2.99+ 5.15+ 0.07+ 2.99)/11= 30.15/11= 2.74 
σ= √2.74 = 1.66   
Top Trading Cycle mechanism (TTC) 
Mean = 2.91 
[(3–2.91)²+(2–2.91)²+(1–2.91)²+(1–2.91)²+ (3–2.91)²+ (5–2.91)²+ (5–
2.91)²+ (5–2.91)²+ (1–2.91)²+ (1–2.91)²+ (5–2.91)²]/11=  
(0.008+0.83+3.65+3.65+0.008+4.37+ 4.37+ 4.37+ 3.65+ 3.65+ 4.37)/11= 32.93/11= 2.99 
σ= √2.99 = 1.73   
 Matching under TTC in favor of positions: 
Mean = 3.45 
[(2–3.45)²+(5–3.45)²+(1–3.45)²+(1–3.45)²+ (3–3.45)²+ (5–3.45)²+ (5–
3.45)²+ (5–3.45)²+ (1–3.45)²+ (5–3.45)²+ (5–3.45)²]/11=  
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(2.1+ 2.4+ 6+ 6+ 0.2+ 2.4+ 2.4+ 2.4+ 6+ 2.4+ 2.4)/11= 34.7/11= 3.15  
σ= √3.15 = 1.77   
 
 Using both above mentioned sums: 
Priority mechanism 
  Mean = 5.45 
[(2–5.45)² + (2–5.45)² + (4–5.45)² + (5–5.45)² + (5–5.45)² + (6–5.45)² + 
(5–5.45)² + (6–5.45)² + (7–5.45)² + (7–5.45)² + (11–5.45)²]/ 11 =  
(11.9+ 11.9+ 2.1+ 0.2+ 0.2+ 0.3+0.2+0.3+ 2.4+ 2.4+ 30.8)/ 11 = 62.7/ 11 = 5.7   
σ= √5.7 = 2.39  
Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism 
Matching based on positions’ requirements: 
Mean = 5.18 
[(7–5.18)² + (5–5.18)² + (2–5.18)² + (4–5.18)² + (5–5.18)² + (6–5.18)² + 
(7–5.18)² + (6–5.18)² + (2–5.18)² + (6–5.18)² + (7–5.18)²]/ 11 =  
(3.31+ 0.03+ 10.11+ 1.39+ 0.03+ 0.67+3.31+0.67+10.11+0.67+3.31)/11=33.61/11 = 3.06   
σ= √3.06 = 1.75 
Top Trading Cycle mechanism (TTC) 
Μean = 7.18 
[(18–7.18)² + (5–7.18)² + (2–7.18)² + (4–7.18)² + (5–7.18)² + (6–7.18)² + 
(11–7.18)² + (6–7.18)² + (2–7.18)² + (13–7.18)² + (7–7.18)²]/ 11 =  
(117.07+ 4.75+ 26.83+ 10.11+ 4.75+ 1.39+14.59+1.39+ 26.83+ 33.87+ 0.03)/ 11 = 
241.61/ 11 = 21.96   
σ= √21.96 = 4.69 
Matching under TTC in favor of positions: 
 82 
Μean = 5.55 
[(7–5.55)² + (5–5.55)² + (2–5.55)² + (4–5.55)² + (5–5.55)² + (6–5.55)² + 
(11–5.55)² + (6–5.55)² + (2–5.55)² + (6–5.55)² + (7–5.55)²]/ 11 =  
(2.1+ 0.3+ 12.6+ 2.4+ 0.3+ 0.2+ 29.7+ 0.2+ 12.6+ 0.2+ 2.1)/ 11 = 62.7/11 = 5.7 
σ= √5.7 = 2.38  
 
 Using partial scores 
Priority mechanism 
  Mean = 7.18 
[(1–7.18)² +(1–7.18)² +(3–7.18)² +(4–7.18)²+(4–7.18)²+(5–7.18)² + (6–
7.18)² + (5–7.18)² + (10–7.18)² + (10–7.18)² + (30–7.18)²]/ 11 =  
(38.19+38.19+17.47+13.82+13.82+4.75+1.39+4.75+7.95+7.95+520.75)/11= 669.05/11 = 
60.82   
σ= √60.82 = 7.8  
Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism 
Mean = 6 
[(10–6)² +(6–6)²+(1–6)²+(3–6)²+ (4–6)² +(5–6)²+(12–6)² +(5–6)²+ (1–6)²+   
 (9–6)² + (10–6)²]/ 11 = (16+ 0+ 25+ 9+ 4+ 1+ 36+ 1+ 25+ 9+ 16)/ 11 = 142/11 = 12.91 
σ= √12.91 = 3.59  
Top Trading Cycle mechanism (TTC) 
Μean = 12.18 
[(45–12.18)² + (6–12.18)² + (1–12.18)² + (3–12.18)² + (6–12.18)² +           
(5–12.18)² + (30–12.18)² + (5–12.18)² + (1–12.18)² + (12–12.18)² + (10–12.18)²]/ 11 =  
(1077.15+38.19+124.99+84.27+38.19+51.55+ 317.55+ 51.55+ 124.99+ 0.03+ 4.75)/11 = 
1913.22/11 = 173.93 
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σ= √173.93 = 13.19 
Matching under TTC in favor of positions: 
Μean = 7.45 
[(10–7.45)² + (6–7.45)² + (1–7.45)² + (3–7.45)² + (6–7.45)² + (5–7.45)² + 
(30–7.45)² + (5–7.45)² + (1–7.45)² + (5–7.45)² + (10–7.45)²]/ 11 =  
(6.5+ 2.1+ 41.6+ 19.8+ 2.1+ 6+ 508.5+ 6+ 41.6+ 6+ 6.5)/ 11 = 646.722/11 = 58.79 
σ= √58.79 = 7.67  
Comparing the extracted standard deviations, the author notices that again the 
Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism with matching based on positions’ requirements is 
clearly the most preferable one. The Priority mechanism and the Top Trading Cycle in 
favor of positions’ requirements have almost the same standard deviation (but this time 
TTC is slightly better), while the Top Trading Cycle mechanism seems to be far away. 
The results that derived from the application of the scoring methods lead to 
important conclusions as far as the effectiveness of each mechanism is concerned: 
 The application of multiple scoring methods offers the potentiality of 
choosing the most preferable according to specific criteria that someone 
will set; for example choosing a mechanism with the smallest Standard 
deviation will minimize variation or spread among the matches, the partial 
scores could be preferred from a sum method in order to penalize a big 
mismatch etc. 
 Median scoring method was proved totally ineffective even though in 
comparison with the arithmetic mean method has the advantage of non 
sensitivity in extreme values. That happens because three out of four two-
sided mechanisms produced the same final score, thus more criteria for the 
final choice are needed.  
 Standard deviation is the most complex but not necessarily the most 
accurate method.   
 There’s a common result according to which the Deferred Acceptance is 
the most preferable algorithm in 8 out of 9 versions of scoring methods.  
 Since the choice of the most preferable method proved easy, the choice of 
the alternative one had difficulties. The reason is that Top Trading Cycle 
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in favor of positions and the Priority mechanism seem to present similar 
results and their effectiveness depend on the applied scoring method; thus 
Priority mechanism seems to be more effective in arithmetic mean scoring 
method while Top Trading Cycle in favor of positions seems to be more 
effective in Standard deviation method. By the time that Standard 
deviation method is a more complex, Top Trading Cycle in favor of 
positions could be considered as the second choice for quantitative 
evaluation. 
 Top Trading Cycle (according to Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez¹⁷) produced 
the highest scores (not effective) in 7 out of 9 methods. The two scoring 
methods in which it gave good results were those that focused on the 
officer’s preference list; that seems logical if we take into account that the 




VI.  SUMMARY - CONCLUSIONS - RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Assignment is the process according to which the organization’s personnel is 
employed in such a way that covers both the organization’s needs and the personnel’s 
preferences. The design and the application of an appropriate assignment process within 
an organization is not a simple procedure and it depends on various parameters. This 
thesis demonstrates the complexity of such a task focusing on crucial parameters like the 
human factor (appeared in many ways such as human decision making/skills/ educational 
level/ past performance/experience/preferences), positions’ specific requirements, 
organizational structure, etc.  
In addition, this thesis focused on the assignment process in a military 
organization and specifically the Hellenic Navy, indicating the unique qualitative and 
quantitative features, differences and gaps (like the amount of personnel that has to be 
assigned, the frequency of the assignment process’ application, the role of hierarchy, etc.) 
that make it a large-scale, complex process that is difficult to “solve.” 
In response to the weaknesses regarding the assignment process in the Hellenic 
Navy, this thesis developed two-sided matching theory as an alternative approach. Two-
sided matching refers to the presence of two distinct groups of agents and the bilateral 
nature of exchange where every agent of each group seeks to match with his/her most 
preferable agent from the other group. Two main categories of models exist, the one-to-
one model (each agent is matched with just one agent, i.e., marriage) and the many-to-
one model (the agents of one group seek to be matched with many agents of the other 
group, i.e., college admission).     
The application of two-sided matching theory has many advantages. 
 It tries to balance the preferences of both involved parties. 
 The outcome is stable and can be an optimal one too. 
 In case of ties alternative solutions are resulted. 
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 The consideration of both sides’ preferences improves the welfare of the 
involved parties. 
Disadvantages also appear (like the necessity of having complete preference lists 
from both sides and the uncertainness of matching each agent with his/her most 
preferable pair), but their weight cannot eliminate the theory’s importance.   
Three two-sided matching mechanisms—Priority, Deferred Acceptance (based on 
officers’ preferences and positions’ preferences), and Top Trading Cycle (according to ¹⁷ 
and in favor of positions)—used for assignment purposes in many organizations were 
chosen. Their functions are described and analyzed focusing on the different attributes 
that each mechanism has. The specific attributes of each mechanism are shown in the 





Stability No Yes No
Strategy proof No Yes Yes
Pareto Efficient No  No* Yes
Complete elimination of 
justified envy
No  Yes* No
*: in conflict
 
The main goal of this thesis was to apply two-sided matching theory and 
specifically the above mentioned mechanisms in the Hellenic Navy’s assignment process 
in order to achieve an effective matching between officers and positions. For that reason 
the author assumed an example where fifteen Hellenic Navy officers (O1, O2 …, and 
O15) were eligible as candidates for ten positions (P1, P2… P10). He tried to reflect a 
real situation by taking into consideration the totally unique nature of the military 
environment that in several cases overthrows the theory, as well as the specific 
characteristics of the Hellenic Navy. 
Evaluating and comparing the results from a qualitative point of view, the author 
concludes that:   
 The three mechanisms demonstrated six common pairs (officer-position) 
out of eleven. 
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 Priority mechanism’s final matching is unstable; that is, there were pairs 
of agents that had not been assigned to each other even though they 
preferred it rather than their match. The instability means that positions 
that require specific criteria were covered by officers that were not 
qualified enough.  
 The two versions of the Deferred Acceptance mechanism produced 
identical and stable matching.  
 The final matching of Top Trading Cycle’s both versions were unstable.  
 In general, from the positions’ perspective the final pairs extracted from 
the Deferred Acceptance mechanism were likely to be more favorable, 
while from the officers’ perspective the results extracted from the three 
mechanisms were similar and the differences insignificant. 
However, in order to choose the best applicable mechanism a quantitative 
evaluation was also needed; therefore, the author applied three main scoring methods 
(with variants) based on mathematical formulas or statistical parameters whose results 
indicate the appropriate mechanism so as to apply it in the Hellenic Navy’s assignment 
process. The chosen main scoring methods were: 
 Arithmetic mean. 
 Median. 
 Standard deviation. 
Arithmetic mean and Standard deviation scoring methods are applied in four 
different versions each. The first version was based on the sum of each officer’s place in 
the position’s preference list, for every matching pair; the second one was based on the 
sum of each position’s place in the officer’s preference list for every matching pair; the 
third one was based on both the above mentioned sums while the fourth one was based on 
the sum of the partial scores (partial score is the product between the number that 
represents the officer’s place in the position’s preference list and the number that 
represents the position’s place in the officer’s preference list for every matching pair). 
The application of the scoring methods gave the author the opportunity to extract 
significant conclusions as follows: 
 The Deferred Acceptance mechanism is proved as the most preferable 
algorithm in 8 out of 9 versions of scoring methods.  
 Top Trading Cycle in favor of positions and the Priority mechanism seem  
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to present similar results; Priority mechanism seems to be more effective 
in arithmetic mean scoring method while Top Trading Cycle in favor of 
positions seems to be more effective in Standard deviation method.  
 Top Trading Cycle (according to Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez¹⁷) produced 
the highest scores (not effective) in 7 out of 9 methods. The two scoring 
methods in which it gave good results were those which took into account 
the position’s place in the officer’s preference list.   
 Standard deviation is the most complex but not necessarily the most 
accurate method.   
 Median scoring method was proved totally ineffective because three out of 
four two-sided mechanisms produced the same final score.  
The extracted conclusions from the application of the above mentioned scoring 
methods can be abstracted in the following table (where the numbers 1–4 reflect the rank 
that each mechanism achieved according to its final score; that is, 1 is the  mechanism 
with the lowest score (so the “winner”), 2 with the second lowest score, etc.): 
Table 22.   Quantitative Evaluation of the Two-Sided Mechanisms (Scoring Methods) 
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 Sum of officer’s place in the 
position’s preference list 
3 1 4 2 
Sum of position’s place in the 
officer’s preference list 
2 3 1 4 
Both sums 2 1 4 3 
Partial scores 2 1 4 3 














Sum of officer’s place in the 
position’s preference list 
3 1 4 2 
Sum of position’s place in the 
officer’s preference list 
4 1 2 3 
Both sums 3 1 4 2 
Partial scores 3 1 4 2 
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The application of multiple scoring methods in order to evaluate the two-sided 
mechanisms in a quantitative way intends to present the potentiality of choosing the most 
appropriate method according to specific criteria. For example, choosing a mechanism 
with the smallest standard deviation will minimize variation or spread among the 
matches, the partial scores could be preferred from a sum method in order to penalize a 
big mismatch etc. 
The following figure offers a visual image that combines the qualitative and 
quantitative evaluation of the mechanisms’ results as they described above.   











































































Figure 21.   Qualitative and quantitative evaluation 
Furthermore, a few more examples from the Hellenic Navy were developed 
covering different cases, even extreme ones, so as to realize the function and analyze the 
results of the specific two-sided mechanisms under various circumstances.         
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The fact is there is a need for a more efficient and effective assignment process in 
the Hellenic Navy. An assignment process based on specific algorithms, which are less 
time-consuming, that takes into account the attributes of officers including their 
preferences and the positions’ requirements would have significant positive effects.  
These positive effects would be for the human part of the organization (like increased 
performance, morale, satisfaction and maybe retention) and the organization in general 
(like covering the positions with qualified personnel, better performance, etc.). 
This thesis provided two-sided matching theory as an alternative process for 
assigning the officers of the Hellenic Navy (and personnel in general) to positions. The 
advantages of the two-sided matching theory’s particular mechanisms and the extracted 
conclusions from the above described examples showed that Hellenic Navy’s Department 
of Personnel may want to seriously consider the adoption of a two-sided matching 
mechanism as the primary method of assignment. However, the implementation of such a 
process cannot be the same for any organization; specific characteristics and functions of 
the Hellenic Navy have to be taken into consideration and various modifications must 
take place before the application.   
 First of all, the creation of a manpower database; this is necessary because 
it would give detailers the opportunity for direct/fast access and managing 
of a huge amount of information which so far is not being processed in an 
optimal manner or even taken into consideration at all. Also, the existence 
of a manpower database would make the assignment process less time-
consuming, while the effort needed would be significantly eliminated.  
 More attention must be paid to the design of the evaluation report form, so 
as to include elements of the evaluator’s personality and perceptions. That 
would be very helpful in order to eliminate the human bias to a great 
degree and the form to reflect the performance of the person who is 
evaluated (a major parameter taken into account during the assignment 
process) as realistic as possible.  
 It would be useful for the process if the preference list, which an officer 
has to fill out and submit annually, gave the officer the opportunity to add 
more preferable positions. That would not reduce the officer’s possibility 
of being matched with a position of high preference but it would provide 
further matching options in a case where the matching with positions of 
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higher priority was infeasible. Furthermore, an officer’s preference list 
with many options would be a handy tool so as to check the rationality of 
the final matching.   
 The elimination of the times that the assignment process takes place 
during a year must be considered because the current situation where the 
assignment process is applied several times leads to an increased 
complexity of the process with negative results. 
 Finally, it is well known that many times the application of theory in real 
life does not produce the expected results. In such a “sensitive” case like 
the assignment process in a military environment, the decision makers 
must be very careful because potential mistakes could prove to be harmful. 
Hence, it is recommended that before the implementation of two-sided 
matching theory in the Hellenic Navy’s assignment process, a partial 
application in the framework of experimentation would be utilitarian and 
provide many useful conclusions. 
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